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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
1. 1 Introduction 
The Great Lakes Region has over the last fifteen years continued to be one the world’s region 
that has mostly been affected by violent conflicts and wars.1 The results of these have caused 
untold suffering, human rights abuses, destruction of infrastructure and the environment and 
have violated International Humanitarian Law. This continuous chaotic situation has also 
severely negatively affected the people of this region.2 These wars have transformed borders into 
an area of conflict. 
In the past, various efforts were made to restore peace and stability in the region, yet the 
interventions to restore peace have had limited success. The secret agreement between Rwanda 
President Paul Kagame and the Democratic Republic of Congo’s President Joseph Kabila, led to 
the official entry of the Rwanda army into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) territory, as 
a way to bring peace to the north and south Kivu provinces.3 The peace deal gives hope for an 
end to Africa’s biggest war, but implementation of the agreement faces profound obstacles.4 
In terms of the agreement Rwanda accepted that it would withdraw its support from the renegade 
General Nkunda’s National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) insurgency and 
simultaneously press it to accept integration into the national army, while the government of 
Kinshasa (DRC) agreed to a joint military strike on its territory with the Rwandan army against 
                                                            
1Mealer,  B  All  things  must  fight  to  live,  stories  of  war  and  deliverance  in  Congo  (2008)  9‐10  (New  York: 
Bloomsburg). 
2International Conference on Great Lakes Region (IC/GLR) Regional Programme of Action for Peace and Security 4 
Available at<http//www.icgl.org> [accessed 15 May 2010]. 
3 Congo: “Five Priorities for a peace building Strategy” (2009) Crisis Group Africa Report No 150. 
4See<http://www.worldpress.org.issues  Vol.49 no 10> [accessed 15 May 2010]. 
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the successors of the 1994 genocidaires. It is an attempt to address a problem that has poisoned 
bilateral relations for 15 years.5 
The celebration of Congo’s 50th year of independence has restored diplomatic relations with the 
presence of the Rwanda and Uganda presidents in Kinshasa (DRC). During his address on 30 
June 2010, the Congolese President says:  
“My ambition is that the Democratic Republic of Congo becomes a tree of peace in the middle of Africa and a force 
of stabilization of the area of the Great Lakes, peace for Congo certainly, but for all countries which surround us. 
The efforts committed already will be continue with the objective of strengthening peace and consolidating the 
democracy, making effective decentralization especially to organize within the time the second general elections. In 
the long term to carry out the reform of the army, the policy force, the services of safety and justice, to maintain 
confidence and the peaceful cohabitation now restored with all the close countries, finally developing the co-
operation and regional integration.’’6   
1.2 Background and rationale of the study 
Insecurity, international human rights and humanitarian law violations in parts of the DRC, 
especially in the eastern provinces, continue to pose serious threats to political stability and 
development in the region. The Great Lakes Region is a geographical expression that 
encompasses a number of freshwater and their integral river basins in the heart of tropical 
Africa.7 Central Africa and East Africa were more familiar terms describing the regional states 
and their systems of interaction.8 
In its fresh logical version, the Great Lakes Region retains its broad geographic reach, combining 
East and Central Africa into a complex network of political and economic interactions, with 
implications for local actors and beyond.9 
The Africa Great Lakes Region was at the centre of a serious geopolitical decomposition in the 
1990’s with continental repercussions and was entangled in different wars and conflicts that 
                                                            
5 Congo: “Five Priorities for a peace building Strategy” (2009) Crisis Group Africa Report No 150. 
6 See<http://www.digitalcongo.net.discour du president J.Kabila le 30/6/2010> [accessed 5 July 2010]. 
7 Khadiagala, GM Security Dynamic in Africa’s Great Lakes Region (2008) 1‐2 (London: Palgrave Macmillan). 
8 Ibid.  
9 Nzongolo, G The Congo from Leopold to Kabila (2002) 214‐215 (London: Zed books). 
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ignored international limit.10 The acute destabilization of the region started on 1 October 1990 
when Rwanda’s Patriotic Front (RPF) attacked Rwanda from Uganda with Ugandan support.11 
After the collapse of the 1993 Arushara Peace Accord and following the genocide and massive 
war crimes and crime against humanity, the RPF won a military victory and took power in July 
1994. More than one million people died and more than two million fled the country, mainly to 
the DRC and Tanzania.12 
After only eight months the process of democratic transition had ended in disaster in Burundi. 
The country embarked on a decade long civil war and thousands of people were killed.13 Burundi 
refugees inundated the Congolese Kivu provinces. In a perverse cycle, the instability of its 
neighbours exposed the DRC, just as the DRC’s instability was a menace to its neighbours. The 
present major conflict and instability in the Great Lakes Region has resulted in the decay of 
states and instrument of regulation in the DRC. Rwanda has been at the heart of the region’s 
instability.14 
The new Rwanda government led by the RPF which took power in July 1994 invaded the 
neighbouring DRC in 1996 and 1998, when the Rwandan civil war continued extra-
territorially.15 Uganda also followed Rwanda and invaded the DRC, accusing the DRC‘s ex-
president Mobutu of giving refuge to the rebel group to prepare attacks on Rwanda.16 In late 
1996, Congolese rebels, backed by Rwandan and Ugandan troops, seized control of the eastern 
of the DRC of exterminate the Hutu militia.17 And once they had established a foothold in the 
east, Laurent Kabila was put in office. 
In August 1998 Rwanda and Uganda again invaded the DRC with the support of Burundi, which 
Kabila showed a firm determination with the support of SADC troops (Zimbabwe, Angola, 
                                                            
10 Stefaan, M and Reyntjens, F The Political economy of the Great Lakes Region in Africa (2006)14(London: Lynne 
Rienner publisher). 
11 Louis, JC and Steven, L”spiegel, the international relation of region”. Policy 2, No 4. 
12 Reyntjens, F The Great African war: Congo and Regional geopolitics (2009) 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Nzongolo, G The Congo from Leopold to Kabila (2002) 214 (London: Zed books). 
15 Khadiagala, GM Security Dynamic in Africa’s Great Lakes Region (2008) 3 (London: Palgrave Macmillan). 
16 Khadiagala, GM Security Dynamic in Africa’s Great Lakes Region (2008) 3 (London: Palgrave Macmillan). 
17Mealer, B All things must fight to live, stories of war and deliverance in Congo (2008) 9 (New York: Bloomsburg). 
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Namibia, Chad, and Burundi rebels)18 the Rwanda and Uganda occupied the eastern of DRC 
shared with the Congolese rebel groups Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) and Movement 
for the Liberation of Congo (MLC). The mercurial allegiances of Rwanda, Uganda and rebel 
faction groups caused even greater turmoil and massive atrocities in the eastern part of the DRC. 
The insecurity in the region has resulted in massive violation of International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL) and human rights by Rwandan, Ugandan and rebels troops in the east of the DRC. Rwanda 
and Uganda were allies when they invaded the east of DRC in 1996 and again in 1998, but in 
1999 their relations had soured and they rapidly developed a profound hostility, dramatically 
demonstrated when their armies clashed on several occasions in Kisangani (DRC).19  
War and armed conflicts have dominated the international media coverage of Africa because of 
the high incidence of political violence, human rights abuse and the multiple frequencies of wars 
and armed conflicts.20 Insecurity and human rights abuses in the Great Lakes Region remain a 
serious concern, despite improved diplomatic co-operation between the DRC and Rwanda. After 
15 years of tension and conflicts different agreements have led to significant improvements in 
border security in the region.21 
In July 1999 at a summit in Lusaka, Zambia, the leaders of Uganda, Rwanda, the DRC, Angola, 
Zimbabwe, and Namibia, signed a peace agreement. The Pretoria Agreement in 2002 and several 
other agreements which led to significant improvement in border security in the region and was 
called for a cessation of hostility, an inter-Congolese dialogue, withdrawal of foreign forces, and 
disarmament of the negative forces, armies and groups responsible for the 1994 Rwanda 
genocide.22 
The parties have implemented most of the agreements except the demobilization of the negative 
forces in the DRC, a major source of diplomatic tension between the DRC and Rwanda. 
Frequent efforts to deal with these issues have not succeeded because the Congolese government 
                                                            
18 Prunier, G Africa’s world war: Congo, the Rwanda genocide, and the making of a continental catastrophe (2008) 
9 (New York: Oxford University Press). 
19 Khadiagala, GM Security Dynamic in Africa’s Great Lakes Region (2008) 32 (London: Palgrave Macmillan). 
20 Francis, DJ Peace and conflicts in Africa (2008) 7 (London: Zed books). 
21<http://www.crs.org.Report> for congress March, 22, 2005 [accessed 14 May 2010]. 
22 <http://www.crs.org.Report> for congress March, 22, 2005 [accessed 14 May 2010]. 
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has not been forceful in its efforts to disarm the negative forces with the support of United 
Nations Organization Mission (MONUC) in the DRC.23 
Although diverse efforts were made in the past to bring an end to these wars and violent conflicts 
in the region, some of them was successful others less so. It became more and more imperative 
to embark on a comprehensive and concerted effort for the creation of a sustained peace and 
security framework in the region.24   
Fully acknowledging these efforts, the heads of state and governments of the eleven members of 
the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) expressed their confidence in 
the restoration of inter-state and intrastate relations based on trust, renaissance of collaboration 
and integration, with the structure of a regional and comprehensive vision for the promotion of 
sustainable peace, security, democracy and development.25 
The Regional Programme of Action for Peace, Security and Development with the support of the 
Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defence among the states seeks to extend such an 
agenda in the region.  
As has been highlighted before, insecurity in the region remains a serious problem, divergence 
improved diplomatic co-operation between Rwanda and the DRC, the renewing military and 
diplomatic collaboration can be the step forward to restore peace, Security and development in 
Great Lakes Region but it is not enough to convey peace to the rest of the region exceptional in 
Kivus.  
The joint military action between Rwanda and the DRC did not produce considerable results 
against the Rwanda Hutu rebels. The great hopes have been put on in the implementation by 
Rwanda and the DRC of the Regional Programme of Action for Peace, Security and 
Development adopted by the ICGRL and the application of the Protocol on Non- Aggression and 
Mutual Defence among the state members.26  
                                                            
23 For more on MONUC’s mandate see <http://www.MONUCorg> [accessed 15 May 2010]. 
24  IC/GLR.Regional Programme of Action for Peace and security 4 available at <http://www.icgl.org>[accessed 14 
May 2010] 
25  See Dar es Salaam Declaration (DD) 20, November 2004, para, 13. 
26 See Dar‐ es‐ salaam Declaration, 20 November 2004 available at <http://www.icgl.org> [accessed 14 May 2010]. 
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The Regional Programmes describe the objectives, policy institutional method, and priority need 
in order to create, reinforce and carry on peace and security in the region. Progress in one 
country typically is not possible without stability and progress in its neighbouring countries. It is 
also clear that regional peace and eventually economic development are highly unlikely without 
external assistance.27 
1.3 Conceptual framework  
This study focuses on the Great Lakes Region, with the emphasis on the renewed diplomatic and 
military co-operation between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Since 1996 to 
date, the eastern part of Congo turned from a peace area to a conflict region. The deal truck by 
Rwanda and the DRC for renewing diplomatic relations is an important step forward to bring 
peace and stability in the region. This can be achieved if the eastern part of the DRC and the 
Great Lakes Region as whole are to be stabilized which will bring an end to massive 
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law violations. Rwanda and the DRC 
government will need to display great courage and commitment if they are to save their 
population from further retribution. 
1.4 Objective and research problem  
The major question that will be addressed in this study is, after many years of diplomatic tension 
between the DRC and Rwanda, the region has had more war and armed conflicts than any other 
region on the continent, has the renewed military and diplomatic co-operation between them 
demonstrated significant steps forward in the security borders of the region? 
The study addresses this question in a broader context that requires dealing with the following 
issues: the new turn in the DRC and Rwanda diplomatic co-operation contributes to a more 
peaceful, stability in the Great Lakes Region? After 15 years of conflicts and International 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law violations in the region, can this be the step forward for 
the stability and development of the region? 
                                                            
27 Ibid. 
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These questions need specific answers. What is the motive of Rwanda and the DRC to bring 
peace and stability to the Great Lakes Region? How the renewing diplomatic relation between 
the DRC and Rwanda benefit for the whole region? What would be the appropriate strategy for 
promoting peace and security? What are the role and strategy of the United Nations (UN) and 
international community in restoring peace and stability in the region? 
The overall objective of the study is to ascertain whether Rwanda and the DRC can agree on a 
durable lasting peaceful and implement regional programmes that consolidate diplomatic 
relations. Normalization of relations between Rwanda and the DRC is essential if the eastern 
Congo and the Great Lakes Region as a whole are to be stabilized. Diplomatic rapprochement 
can build capacity for the realization of security, generating border economic zones would led to 
a prosper Great Lakes Region because of potential natural resources available in the region with 
the support of the UN and international community. 
1.5 Methodology 
There exists no social methodology which is obligatory, said Professor Madeleine Grawitz.28 The 
methodology depends on the topic before research and investigator.29 The methodology of this 
study will be mainly analytic and descriptive.     
1.6 Limitation of the study 
This study is undertaken in South Africa due to various constraints. The study will be limited to a 
case study of the conflicts between the DRC and Rwanda, and their renewed diplomatic and 
military co-operation. It would have also a look on different countries involved in the conflict. It 
is believed that the selected countries (states) constitute the base of conflict, war, atrocities and 
instability in the Great Lakes Region. 
1.7 Literature review  
The materials used shall include case law, constitutions, textbooks, journal articles, newspaper 
reports, the internet and other relevant literature sources. This approach will highlight the origin 
                                                            
28Grawitz (M), Methodes des sciences sociale (1984) 2 (Paris: Dalloz Press).   
29 Ibid. 
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and the causes of the conflicts between Rwanda and the DRC. Books and articles have been 
written on the Great Lakes Region and its Regional Programme of Action for Peace and Security 
adopted by the ICGLR (International Conference on the Great Lakes Region). But none have 
been written about or have made mention of the application and impact of the new diplomatic 
rapprochement between Rwanda and the DRC in the region. This is what this mini-thesis seeks 
to do. 
1.8 Chapter outline 
This mini-thesis is divided into 6 chapters. Chapter 1 will be an introduction to the study. Here 
the background, rationale, and objective of the study, the conceptual framework, and research 
question, methodology and literature review will be discussed.  
In Chapter 2, I will question and analyze the meaning of peace, security, stability, conflict and 
poverty from a human rights perspective. 
In Chapter 3, the causes and consequences of the conflict between Rwanda and the DRC will be 
examined. Chapter 4 will explore the renewing diplomatic co-operation between Rwanda and the 
DRC. There will also be a brief look at the role of the UN, international community, and other 
regional institutions and efforts made to bring peace in the region. 
Chapter 5 will be examining the violations of International Humanitarian Law during armed 
conflict in the DRC and it applicability. 
The last chapter will contain conclusions drawn from the study and will make suitable 
recommendations.  
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                                                            CHAPTER 2                
                                    Meaning of Peace, Security, Conflict and Poverty 
2.1 Introduction 
In general all human beings desire security, stability, peace and development in the world, 
particularly in the region in which they live. However, it is not always very clear what people 
understand as peace, security, and stability, and how these conditions can be attained and 
preserved in society.30 This chapter intends to explore the meaning of peace, security, poverty 
and conflict.  
2.2 Peace 
The first point to be made here is that peace is a universal concept. Every society desires it and 
none can exist without it.31 In this analysis, peace will be examined from two different 
perspectives: peace as a universal concept and peace in the African tradition. 
2.2.1 Peace as a universal concept 
The question to be asked is - what is peace and under what circumstances does the political will 
exist for peace and stability? There is little accord on the answer. We can distinguish at least 
three different meanings or types of peace. Peace is regarded as the simple absence of war; peace 
as functional and economic interaction, which is also referred to as transactional peace; and 
lastly peace is often seen as a social condition in which accommodation rather than force 
mediates change in a short integration or in perpetual peace.32 
A cold peace and the absence of war may be achieved by a no threats system. Ranabir has 
distinguished two systems of peace practice, Hegemony and Deterrence. Hegemony is rarely an 
exclusively corrective system.33 Deterrence is the threat of force to prevent revolting actions by 
another hegemony, and deterrence may achieve a superficial peace in which a hegemony can use 
                                                            
30 Francis, DJ Peace and conflict in Africa (2008) 32‐33 (London: Zed Books). 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ranabir, B Peace Studies: an introduction to the concept, scope, and term (2004) 32‐33 (London: New Delhi). 
33 Ibid. 
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the threat of punishment to stop others using force and thus maintain a minimalist peace.34 A 
deterrent also can practise a minimalist form of peacemaking by threatening to exact costs well 
beyond the gain an opponent may hope to make from an attack.35 
Christians and Jews consider peace as a divine greeting. For example, the salutation “shalom” is 
as popular among Christians and Jews as “A salaam aleikum” is among Muslims.36 Both terms 
mean “peace be unto you”.37 The most basic but popular understanding of peace is that it is the 
opposite of conflict or violence.  
A major limitation of this understanding of the concept is that, it places exclusive emphasis on 
averting violence. It does not shed light on how to contend with psychological and structural 
violence, which defined as the “social and personal violence arising from unjust, repressive 
national or international political and social structures.”38 But this kind of peace is technically 
referred to as “negative”, a concept introduced by Galtung in the editorial to the first issue of the 
Journal of Peace Research.39 He defined negative peace as “absence of violence, absence of war, 
and positive peace as” the integration of human society.40 
Positive peace considers the prevention of violence as a restricted goal on the ground that it does 
not address the structural violence that bedevils the world or which supports a violence 
position.41 Peace is a type of relation between a political system and communities that is 
characterised by the absence of armed conflict.42 A peaceful society is one that does not make 
war with another community. 
2.2.2 Peace in African tradition 
In traditional African societies, peace is not a theoretical notion, but rather a down to earth and 
practical concept. In African traditional religion peace is conceived not in relation to conflict and 
                                                            
34 Ranabir, S Peace Studies: an introduction to the concept, scope, and term (2004) 33 (London: New Delhi). 
35Ibid. 
36 Francis, DJ Peace and conflict in Africa (2008) 33 (London: Zed Books). 
37 Ibid. 
38 Galtung, J ‘’Social cosmology and peace Research “(1981) Vol 18 No 2 Journal of peace research 2. 
39 Ibid. 
40Galtung, J ‘’Social cosmology and peace Research “(1981) Vol 18 No 2 Journal of peace research 2. 
41  Francis, DJ Peace and conflict in Africa (2008) 33 (London: Zed Books).  
42  Levinson, D Aggression and Conflict (1994) 136 (California: Denver, Colorado Oxford). 
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war, but in relation to order, harmony and equilibrium.43 It is a religious value in that the order, 
harmony and equilibrium in the universe and society are believed to be divinely established and 
the obligation to maintain them is religious.44  
2.2.2.1 Peace as fullness of life 
The promotion and enhancement of life is the central principle of traditional African morality. 
The goal of all moral conduct is, therefore, the fullness of life.45 Human life is considered full in 
Africa when it is marked by spiritual, material, and social blessings. Peace is an excellent 
relationship well lived, health, absence of force and divergence, being strong and prosperous.46 
Peace is the totality of wellbeing, fullness of life here and hereafter, what the Yomba call Alafia, 
the sum total of all that man may desire: an undisturbed harmonious life.47 Any action that is 
capable of hindering another from living the fullness of life is considered a breach of peace.48 
2.2.2.2 Peace as the result of harmonious living 
Harmony is a fundamental notion in traditional African religion and thought. In a person’s life, 
harmony is found in the ability to reconcile one’s desires with one’s means to co-ordinate one’s 
sentiments and their verbal expressions, as well as the ability to discharge one’s religious and 
social duties.49 
In traditional African religion peace in the community cannot be separated from justice. Peter 
Sarpong underlines the context of “Ashanti culture”: justice produces peace, there can be no 
peace without justice, peace is honourable, and peace can never be achieved when a person is 
disgraced or when you disgrace another person.50 Peace must relate to one another on equal 
                                                            
43 <http://www.afrikaworld.net/afrel/goddiorah.htm Africa peace> [accessed 07 July 2010]. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Rweyemamu R. “Religion and Peace” (1984) Vol 38. Studia missionalia 382. 
46 Ibid. 
47Awolalu,JS,  “The  Yoruba  philosophy  of  life,  in  presence  Africaine”(  1970)  21  .Available  at 
<http://www.africaworld.net.afret> [accessed  7 July 2010] . 
48 <http://www.africaworld.netafrel/goddiorah.htmAfrica peace> [accessed 7 July 2010]. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Sarpong PK “Africa Traditional Religion and Peace” (1989) Vol 38 Studia missionalia. 358. 
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terms. On the theme of peace one sees very clearly the very close relationship existing between 
religion and morality in Africa. 51 
Immorality or bad behaviour disturbs peace in the community. It makes the ancestors angry, 
provokes the divinities and may even annoy God.52 This explains why “one of the main means of 
restoring peace in society is to find out what has gone wrong spiritually  through special rituals 
morale to restore the state of equilibrium.”53 War was habitually not required for its own sake.  
2.2.2.3 Peace as a gift of God 
Since human beings are aware of their limitations in attaining and maintaining peace between 
people in their societies and also aware of the fact that God is the source of universal order and 
harmony, they regularly turn to Him to ask for peace.54 African tradition equally believes that 
true peace is a gift of God.55 One of the main purposes of sacrifice is expiation. In offering 
expiation sacrifices, human beings are asking God and the other spiritual beings to intervene and 
help restore the peace that has been violated.56 
Like in every other aspect of the religious life of Africans, the divinities and the ancestors are 
very close collaborators of God in the administration of the universe, especially of human 
affairs.57  
2.2.2.4 Peace as a pre-condition for progress 
If justice is the pre-condition for peace, then peace is the requirement for progress.  Africans 
notwithstanding their creed barely ever talk of progress without founding it on peace.  
The Yoruba expresses this in very simple and straight terms: “I want to build a home; I want to 
have children; without peace, these things are impossible.”58 
                                                            
51 Rweyemamu R. “Religion and Peace” (1984) Vol 38 Studia missionalia 381. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Sarpong, PK “African Traditional Religion and Peace” (1989) Vol 38 Studia missionalia 359. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Sarpong, PK “African Traditional Religion and Peace” (1989) Vol 38 Studia missionalia. 360. 
57Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
  	
When an individual or the community has peace within, the terrain is prepared for yet more 
peace and this brings the individual or the community closer to fullness of life.59  
2.3 Security 
The problem addressed in this section concerns human security or, this can also call it, human 
stability. For a better understanding of this issue, the mini-thesis will focus on the first step taken 
by the Africa Great Lakes Region towards promoting increased human stability and the 
prevention of armed conflict in the region. This study also focuses on the steps that must be 
taken in order to realise the objectives of development and durable stability. 
Security can be defined as the guarantee of safety. One might further define the guarantee of 
safety as “the political arrangements” that make war less likely, which provide for negotiations 
between states than belligerence and which aim to preserve peace as the normal condition among 
states.60 
The term security has sometimes assumed a sinister implication in the common sense of national 
security. National security can refer to safety, the possibility of the absence of war and the 
possibility of negotiations rather than belligerence.61 However, it can also refer to the 
maintenance of peace as the standard condition for some people within society but not for others 
belonging to the same nation.62  
National security as a term has also come to indicate all the purposes of defence, including 
preparations for belligerence, pre-emptive strikes and even any presumed vital interest; as a 
result, policies of national security may precipitate insecurity rather than security by being the 
exclusive tools of those in power.63   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
58 Awolalu, JS “the Yoruba philosophy of  live  in presence Africanine” (1970) Vol 8 The African Book Record 21‐22 
Available at <http//www.africaworld.net.afret> [accessed 7 July 2010]. 
59Awolalu, JS “the Yoruba philosophy of live in presence Africanine” (1970) 21‐22. 
60<http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/books/UNESCO/Maxted.html  Human  Stability  and  Conflict  in  the  Horn  of  Africa> 
[accessed 16 July 2010]. 
61 Ibid. 
62<http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/books/unesco/maxted.html Human stability and conflict in horn of Africa>[accessed 
19 July 2010]. 
63 Ibid. 
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2.4 Conflict  
Conflict constitutes a major threat to the African Great Lakes Region’s development in terms of 
loss of human life, destruction of property, displacement of people sometimes across 
international borders, and diversion of resources meant for promoting sustainable development 
into arms purchases and funding of expensive peacekeeping support operations.64 
The mainstreaming of conflict analysis in the day to day practices of a large number of 
organizations operating in pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict environments is a remarkable 
achievement that will potentially have significant consequences in respect of the prevention, 
management and resolution of violent conflict as well as the efficacy of assistance.65 
A conflict can be internal to individuals. Conflict as a concept can help explain many aspects of 
social life, such as, social disagreement, conflicts of interests and fights between individuals, 
groups, or organizations.66 In terms of political context, conflict can refer to wars, revolutions or 
other struggles which may involve the use force, as in the terms armed conflict.67 
In this context the terms war and armed conflict will be examined.  
War is a behaviour pattern exhibited by many primate species,68 including humans, and also 
found in many ant species.69 The primary feature of this behaviour pattern is a certain state of 
organized violent conflict that is engaged in between two or more separate social entities.70 
In the book On War, Prussian military general and theoretician Carl Von Clausewitz, refers to 
war as the “continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”71 War is an 
interaction in which two or more opposing forces have a struggle of wills.72 
                                                            
64 Francis DJ Peace and conflict in Africa (2008) 46 (London: Zed Books).  
65 Francis, DJ Peace and conflict in Africa (2008) 32‐33 (London: Zed Books).  
66 Ibid. 
67<http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/definition_all.htm#inten> [accessed 19 July 2010] 
68See  O’  Connel,  Sanjida  (2004‐01‐07).  “Apes  of  war  …  are  it  in  our  genes?  The  daily  Telegraph.  London. 
<http;//www.telegraph.co.uk/science‐news/3317461/Apes‐war‐is‐it‐in‐our‐genes.html.  Analysis  of  chimpanzee 
war behavior> [accessed 19 July 2010]. 
69 See” Warrior Ants: The Enduring Threat of the Small War and the Landmine” 
1996.<http://www.papers.ss.m.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=935783. Scholarly comparisons between human 
and ant wars [accessed 19 July 2010]. 
70 Ibid. 
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A civil war is a war between factions of citizens of one country (such as in the English civil war), 
or else a dispute between two nations that were created out of one formerly united country.73 
Armed Conflict  is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where 
the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, 
results in at least 25 battle related deaths in one calendar year.74 The armed conflict can be 
international or non-international. 
International armed conflict usually refers to an inter-state conflict. The ICRC Commentary on 
the Four Geneva Conventions states that “[a]ny difference arising between two States and 
leading to the intervention of members of armed forces is an armed conflict which is the meaning 
of Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, even if one the Parties denied the 
existence of a state of war.”75  
A non-international armed conflict exists when there is “protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.”76  
2.5 Poverty 
The meaning and concept of poverty have changed over the centuries. The definition of poverty 
in terms of material deprivation is confirmed by the United Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (UNCESCR) as insufficient income to buy minimum goods and 
services77 and which defines poverty as the state of being extremely poor. It defines the term 
“poor” as lacking sufficient money to live at a standard considered comfortable or normal.78 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
71Von Clausewitz, Carl   On War (2006)77‐ 87( Gutenberg Books) Available at <http://www.gutenberg.og./books.[ 
accessed 19 September 2010] 
72Ibid 
73See  Fearon,  J”Iraq’s  Civil  war”  in  Foreign  Affairs,  March/April  2007.  For  further  discussion  on  civil  war 
classification, see the section definition. 
74 See <http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/definition_all.htm#intrn>[accessed 16 July 2010]. 
75 ICRC Commentary on the Four Geneva Convention of 1949, 20‐21. 
76 See Tadic case, No.ITCY‐94‐1‐AR72 paragraph 70. 
77Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Poverty and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights’ Statement adopted by the Committee on 4 May 2001,E/C.12/2001/10, 10 May 2001 Para 8. 
78  Committee  on  Economic,  Social,  and  Cultural  Rights:  Poverty  and  the  International  Covenant  on  Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights’ Statement adopted by  the Committee on 4 May 2001,E/C.12/2001/10, 10 May 2001 
Para 8. 
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Poverty is today defined in terms of the absence of basic freedoms or capabilities.79 In analyzing 
social justice, there is a strong case for judging individual advantage in terms of the capabilities 
that a person has, that is, the substantive freedoms he or she enjoys to lead the kind of life he or 
she has reason to value.80 In this perspective, poverty must be seen as the deprivation of basic 
capabilities rather than merely as income, which is the standard principle for identifying 
poverty.81 
The Office of the High Commission for Human Right (OHCHR) made clear the meaning of 
poverty from a human rights perspective when it defined poverty as the denial of a person’s 
rights to a range of basic capabilities, such as, the capability to be adequately nourished, to live 
in good health, and to take part in decision making processes in the social and cultural life of a 
community.82 In the language of rights, one may say that a person living in poverty is one for 
whom a number of human rights remain unfulfilled, such as, the rights to food, health, political 
participation and so on.83 
In this regard, not all rights will qualify as basic rights for the purposes of the definition of 
poverty. Whatever the precise definition used, poor people share several key attributes, which are 
both a result and a cause of poverty.84 These attributes include: 
(a) Inability to secure basic needs (shelter, food, health); 
(b) Lack of income (or assets that can provide income); 
(c) Social exclusion (inability to participate in the political process); 
(d) Lack of opportunities to improve one’s condition; and 
(e) Vulnerability (e.g. natural disaster, socio-political instability, market/ price risks). 
                                                            
79 An approach made popular by Sen, A. for instance, Development as Freedom (2010). 
80 Ibid. 
81 An approach made popular by Sen, A. for instance, Development as Freedom (2010). 
82 <http//www.nric.net/poverty/publ/>iascp.pdf /Property Rights, Collective action and poverty, the role of > 
[accessed 5 August 2010]. 
83OHCHR Principles and Guidelines for a Human Rights and Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies available at 
<www.ohchc.org> [accessed 5 August 2010]. 
84<www.nric.net/poverty/publ/  iascp.pdf /Property Rights, Collective action and poverty, the role of> [accessed 5 
August 2010]. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored peace as a general theory and three notions of peace were also 
discussed, namely peace as the mere absence of war, peace as a social condition, and peace as 
functional and economic interaction. In traditional African religion, peace is a fullness of life led 
by the goal of moral conduct. Peace is also seen as the effect of harmonious living, which is 
characterized by the existence of close affiliations between religion and integrity. In African 
tradition peace is considered as a gift of God and as necessity for development. 
The term security was examined as a state of feeling secure. No one can agree to reside in an 
insecure area or a state dominated by war, armed conflict and poverty. War and armed conflict 
thus were, and continue to be, a main root of poverty in the world, particularly in African 
societies. On the basis of this theoretical framework this mini-thesis will be investigating the 
causes and consequences of the conflict between Rwanda and the DRC in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
               The causes and consequences of conflict between Rwanda and the DRC 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 seeks to indentify the causes of the fifteen-year conflict between Rwanda and the DRC 
and its consequences. One cannot discuss the ongoing conflict without accounting for the fact 
that the conflict directly embraces the entire Great Lakes Region. 
The overall intention of this chapter will be mainly to examine the impact of the conflict in the 
Great Lakes Region due to the implacability of Rwanda and the DRC and role played during and 
after the conflict. This chapter also will attempt to describe some guidelines to provide an 
understanding of the origin of the conflict.  Although it will be difficult for this study to give all 
the reasons for the conflict, it is nevertheless important to understand the events which embraced 
the whole region.     
3.2 Causes of the conflict 
The eastern and southern parts of the DRC have historically been an integral part of the Great 
Lakes Region as regions that have been more associated with provincial and local leaders rather 
than being governed by an official central administration.85 The serious geo-political breakdown 
of the region started in October 1990 with continental consequence and was involved in different 
wars and armed conflicts that ignored international limits. 86 
The rebel force, composed primarily of ethnic Tutsi, blamed the government for failing to 
democratise and resolve the problems of some 500,000 Tutsi refugees living in a Diaspora 
around the world.87 The conflict dragged on for almost two years until a cease-fire accord was 
                                                            
85 Adie, C Politics in Africa: A new Beginning? (2003) 157 (Wodsworth; Thomson Learning, Belmont CA). 
86 Ibid. 
87 Niemann, M “War Making and State Making in Central Africa” (2007) Vol 53 No 3 Africa today 20‐40. 
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signed on 12 July 1992 in Arusha, Tanzania, fixing a timetable for an end to the conflict, and for 
political dialogue leading to a peace accord and power sharing.88 
On 6 April 1994 the airplane carrying President Habyarimana and the President of Burundi was 
shot down as it prepared to land at the capital Kigali. As though the shooting down of the 
airplane was a signal, military and militia groups began rounding up and killing all Tutsis and 
political moderates, regardless of their ethnic background.89 
The RPF rebel groups stationed in Kigali under the Arusha Accord began their attack 
immediately after the shooting down of the presidential plane. The militia fought their way out of 
Kigali and joined up with RPF units in the north and the RPF then restarted its invasion, and civil 
war raged concurrently with the genocide for two months.90 French forces landed in Goma in 
June 1994 on a humanitarian mission under authorisation of Mobutu’s regime. They were 
deployed throughout southwest Rwanda in an area they called Zone Turquoise, quelling the 
genocide and stopping the fighting in that area.91 
The Rwanda government army was conquered by the RPF forces and fled across the border to 
the DRC, followed by more than two million refugees who fled to the DRC, Tanzania, and 
Burundi. The RPF forces took the capital Kigali in July 1994, and control the country devastated 
by the armed conflict and genocide.92  
Due to economic factors, ex-President Mobutu had failed to provide his country with even the 
most basic of infrastructure. Among other things, his government was incapable of providing 
most of the basic needs for the avoidance of an invasion, loss of territory, crime prevention and 
the ability for peaceful resolution and security.93  
The entire Great Lakes Region became inundated with a surplus of small arms and military 
hardware left over from the Cold War era, allowing increasing political conflict to engender 
                                                            
88 Niemann, M “War Making and State Making in Central Africa” (2007) Vol 53 No 3 Africa today 20‐40. 
89 Dobson, S “Conflict in the Great Lakes Region” (2009) INTR3064 Africa on a Global Stage 1‐4. 
90 Niemann, M “War Making and State Making in Central Africa” (20070 Vol 53 No 3 Africa today 20‐40. 
91 Adie, C Politics in Africa: A new Beginning? (2003) 157 (Wadsworth: Thomson Learning, Belmont CA). 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
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various armed rebel groups.94 In 1991 at the National Congolese Sovereign Conference, Mobutu 
encouraged Congolese citizens from north and south Kivu to expel Rwandans and Ugandans 
back the border, and to garner Congolese support he consequently rescinded their Congolese 
citizenship.95.  
Under Mobutu’s regime in 1990 ethnic tensions raged through the country as a direct result of 
increasing political confusion in Rwanda and Burundi. With the influx of Hutu refugees, what 
had been a local conflict quickly became a nationwide war. President Mobutu regime was tied to 
that of the Hutu refugees who constituted an obstacle to the strengthening of the Tutsi-dominated 
regime in Rwanda.96 
The tension increased with the political divisions of colonialism which was push ahead in the 
earliest part of the twentieth century and which gave rise to an outbreak of conflict in its most 
severe form.97 The Banyarwanda, the original inhabitants of the mountainous regions of Burundi 
and Rwanda, were mostly dispersed throughout Uganda and the DRC well before colonisation.98 
Colonial political divisions and ethnic categorisation forged unequal political rights and in 
stratification of citizenship in an area which had became the four separate countries of the DRC, 
Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, ruled by three separated European power.99 Mobutu’s rise to 
power in the DRC saw irregular and variable changes in his citizenship policies. After losing 
citizenship rights granted to them in 1972, Rwandans and Burundians living in the DRC were 
felt marginalized and turned to the rising RPF for support.100  
In 1994, there were over two million refugees living in camps in the eastern part of the 
DRC/Zaire, as a result of the political confusion experienced in Rwanda and Burundi in the 
previous decades, and many refugees at that time were given Congolese citizenship by ex 
                                                            
94 Moffett, L “Ending the cycle of violence in the Congo, is peace possible in the Heart of Darkness? (2009) Journal 
of Peace, Conflict and Development 4. 
95 Niemann, M “War Making and State Making in Central Africa” (2007) Vol 53 No 3 Africa today 20‐40. 
96Dobson, S” Conflict in the Great Lakes Region” (2009) 2 INTR3064 Africa on a Global Stage. 
97 Adie, C Politics in Africa: A new Beginning (2003) 157 (Wadsworth: Thomson Learning, Belmont CA). 
98 Adie, C Politics in Africa: A new Beginning (2003) 159(Wadsworth: Thomson Learning, Belmont CA). 
99 Niemann, M “War Making and State Making in Central Africa” (2007) Vol 53 No 3 Africa today20‐40. 
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President Mobutu,101 coinciding with enormous economic problems in the DRC thus putting 
additional stress on limited state resources.   
The refugee camps were controlled by the Rwandan genocide perpetrators, the Interahamwe, 
who enjoyed support from the Mobutu government and who started launching attacks on 
Rwanda and the Congolese Banyamulenge in South Kivu, giving rise to the conflict in the 
region.102 After taking power in Rwanda, the RPF set two goals to be achieved: the 
extermination of the Hutu refugees and the exclusion of Mobutu from control of the DRC.103  
The calculation was simple. It was thought that with the presence of two armies on Congolese 
territory (the former Rwandan Armed Forces that had moved into the, DRC and the Congolese 
Armed Forces themselves), Mobutu would side in the case of war with Museveni’s Uganda and 
Kagame’s Rwanda.104 
The removal of the two armies became a main concern for the international community which 
had adopted Rwanda’s policy of preventing genocide in the DRC. The internationalisation of the 
war in Kivu became a reality when Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and their allies, with the 
assistance of the international community, intervened directly in the DRC’s politics and internal 
affairs.105  
Legitimately, their actions were undertaken within the structure of a three party commission, 
consisting of the DRC, Rwanda and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR). In reality, a plethora of humanitarian organisations were involved. All these actors 
failed in their responsibilities, principally because Tutsi leaders and their factions rejected the 
idea of the Hutu refugees returning to Rwanda. Rwanda’s new president, Paul Kagame, preferred 
a policy of internal and external oppression that would last for more than six years.106 
                                                            
101Adie, C Politics in Africa: A new Beginning (2003) 159 (Wadsworth: Thomson Learning, Belmont CA). 
102 Khadiagala, GM Security Dynamic in Africa’s Great Lakes Region (2006) 203‐204 (London: Palgrave Macmillan). 
103 Ibid 
104 Mangu, A “Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Protection of Rights under the African Charter” 
A.B (2003) Vol 3 African Human Rights Law Journal 235. 
105 Khadiagala, GM Security Dynamic in Africa’s Great Lakes Region (2006) 204 (London: Palgrave Macmillan). 
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Most of the Rwandan Hutu refugees, who returned home freely or forcibly, were killed by the 
new leaders and civilian Tutsis. However, the strategy that President Paul Kagame engaged 
towards the DRC after taking power in 1994 went far beyond revenge for the 1994 genocide and 
the obstruction of the Hutu refugees return to Rwanda.107  
He was also intent on keeping most of the RPF’s combatants out of Rwanda in order to secure 
his own power and to cover up the plundering of the DRC’s natural resources.108  
Following the Rwandan genocide in 1994, more than a million refugees streamed into the 
refugees camps of south and north Kivus, which rapidly became controlled by Hutu refugees 
(Interahamwe) who enjoyed protection from President Mobutu.109  
It was from these Rwandan refugee camps that the Interahamwe rearmed and launched attacks 
on Rwanda and the Congolese Banyamulenge in South Kivu, giving rise to the conflict in the 
region.110 
 After getting international support to prevent attacks made on them (Tutsis) by the Interahamwe 
and Mobutu’s government, the RPF counter-attacked, and by September 1996 the Great Lakes 
Region conflict had erupted.111    
In 1996, all these entangled interests culminated in a joint attack on the DRC by the armies of 
Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda in a bid to demolish the Hutu refugee camps and eliminate the 
refugees, and also to remove Mobutu after 32 years in power.  
The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) led by Laurent Desire 
Kabila joined forces with the RPF, pledging support for Rwanda’s border security in return for 
their support for the revolt against Mobutu.112 
                                                            
107 Dunn, KC Identity, Space and the Political Economy of conflict in Central Africa: The Geopolitical Economy of 
Resource Wars (2005) 244 (London: le Billion edition). 
108 Some of  them were Ugandan demobilized  soldiers  that Museveni had  sent  into  the war  in Rwanda  in 1990. 
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Kabila gained ground on his march west from his base in South Kivu and gained many anti-
Mobutu supporters from Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Angola and even some logistic support 
from the US.113  
The agreement creating the new movement (AFDL) was supposed to have been signed in 
Lemera in South Kivu on 1 October 1996. The signatories were the representative of four 
different groups: Laurent Kabila (Partie de la Revolution Populaire PRP). Deogratia Bugera 
(Alliance Democratique Populaire ADP). Anselme Masasu Nindaka (Mouvement Revulitionaire 
pour la Liberation du Zaire). Andres Kisasa Ngandu (Conseil National de Resistance pour la 
Democration).114 
Laurent Desire Kabila was the choice to lead the movement because he was a true Congolese, 
originally from Katanga province and one of Patrice Lumumba’s disciples.   
On 17 May 1997, Laurent Desire Kabila seized power in Kinshasa/DRC by proclaiming himself 
the new President of the country to the disappointment of Rwanda and Uganda, who would have 
preferred a Tutsi of the DRC or a more dependent man to assume power in Kinshasa.115 Anyhow, 
the objectives of the war carried under the AFDL’s umbrella and known as the Tutsi or first 
Banyamulenge rebellion were accomplished.116 After only fifteen months, the relation between 
DRC, Rwanda and Uganda breakdown. 
Kabila ended military co-operation with Uganda and Rwanda by fearing Congolese alienation, 
but attempted to expel all troops from the DRC. The new war was launched in August 1998 by 
another new rebel group called Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) with the support of 
Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi.117 The objective of this second war was to remove Kabila from 
power and to control the provinces of Kivus, a process that has continued to poison the relations 
between the two countries until today.  
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3.3  Rwanda centre of the region’s instability 
Although Rwanda has been at the centre of the region’s instability since 1994 after the genocide, 
it invaded the DRC in 1996 by supporting rebel groups with troop and ammunitions.118 In 1998, 
Rwanda again invaded the DRC after a breakdown in the deal with President Laurent Desire 
Kabila.  
3.3.1  Rwanda’s first incursion in to the DRC 
The first Rwanda invasion of the DRC occurred in 1996 can be seen as the direct result of the 
failures of international intervention in Rwanda during and after the genocide when millions of 
Hutu refugees fled across the border to escape the advance of the RPF.119 
In response to continuing ethnic violence and attacks Rwanda and Uganda backed the rebel 
group, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) led by 
Laurent Kabila, in the hope of improving their own security by removing anti-Uganda rebels and 
the remnants of the genocide of the Interahamwe/ex-FAR, as well as securing economic 
resources in the eastern parts of the DRC.120  
The objectives of Rwanda’s first invasion of the DRC, conducted under the AFDL’s umbrella 
and known as the Tutsi or First Banyamulenge Rebellion was to destroy the Hutu refugee camps, 
eliminate the refugees and remove Mobutu from power.121 After seven months of war between 
AFDL and its allies Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, against Mobutu’s regime, the objectives 
achieved when Kabila’s AFDL seized power in Kinshasa on 17 May 1997 and became the third 
President of the DRC/Zaire. 
Rwanda, after placing Laurent Kabila into power, began to dictate the actions in the DRC. The 
head of the army of the DRC, James Kabarebe was an officer of the RPF who was in charge of 
the operation during Rwanda invasion and is now the defence minister of Rwanda. It became 
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apparent within weeks of Kabila’s inauguration that his assurances of increased security against 
Interahamwe attacks and the promise of territorial security zones were hollow.122  
Moreover, after disagreement between Kabila and his allies Rwanda and Uganda, Kabila ended 
the military co-operation, fearing Congolese disaffection but assayed to expel all troops from his 
country. In August 1998 Kabila dismissed the head of Army James Kabarebe and expelled all the 
Rwandan soldiers from the DRC. 
Within weeks Kabila’s government underwent revenge attacks in a land war in the DRC, 
supported by the Rwandan refugees living there, and underpinned by claims that Kabila did 
honour engagements made between two countries. The new wave of war was launched by 
Uganda and Rwanda known as the War of Correction and the objective being to remove Kabila 
from power by the so- called Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD).123 
Under attack from Uganda and Rwanda in Congolese territory, Kabila appealed to the South 
African Development Community (SADC)124 for the support required to preserve his capital 
Kinshasa and embroiled the region in the biggest war.    
3.3.2 The second Rwanda incursion in to the DRC  
The second war in the DRC was caused by Rwanda and Uganda after the break in the military 
and political co-operation with the Kabila government. According to Rwanda and Uganda, 
President Laurent Kabila proved no different than his predecessor Mobutu, and continued to 
incite ethnic tensions in the east of the country. 125 
Rwanda and Uganda wanted to ensure their own security by replacing Kabila with a more 
favourable ally and removing the rebel threat but they also sought to benefit from economic 
resources widely available in the two Kivu provinces.126 So began the second DRC war, with 
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Rwanda and Uganda backing the rebel groups, the RCD and the Movement for the Liberation of 
Congo (MLC) led by the farmer Congolese vice President Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo.   
What is the rationale for Rwanda’s and Uganda’s second invasion of the DRC? The fight was the 
result of two causes. First, there was an internal conflict about the distribution of positions 
between different factions of the AFDL in particular between the Banyamulenge, supported by 
Rwanda and Uganda and the Kabila group emphasising broader Congolese interests.127 
Secondly, mutual doubts emerged between the new government in Kinshasa and its former 
supporters because of Rwanda‘s suspicion that Kabila was backing the Interahamwe and 
recruiting them into the new army.128 
Kabila’s side was afraid that Rwanda could engineer a coup against his government as they had 
done against Mobutu, in favour of a Banyamulenge leadership. Uganda also was unhappy with 
Kabila’s warm relations with the Sudan government because of Sudanese support of rebels in 
northern and western Uganda. Kabila had initially granted key positions to the Banyamulenge in 
his government and accorded relative freedom to Uganda and Rwanda to patrol their borders 
within the DRC but he invited the anger of antagonists who accused him of obeisance to 
Rwanda, Uganda, and of appeasing the Banyamulenge.129   
3.3.3 Rwanda, Uganda and rebel groups strategies 
The RCD, after the set thing up the movement, was confronted with a serious problem of 
leadership in the composition of its staff members. The Executive Committee, the Political 
Council, and the army were dominated by the Tutsi Banyamulenge rather than the Congolese 
citizen.130  
This multi-ethnic composition did hide one reality: the Banyamulenge controlled everything in 
the movement, because they either held the chair or the deputy presidency as well as lower 
ranking strategic positions of the group.131 
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The Tutsi domination caused dissatisfaction among the Congolese. As a matter of fact, when 
Rwanda and Uganda determined to break ties and operate separately the RCD also divided. The 
Congolese in the RCD followed their “masters”, and joined the pro-Rwanda RCD, called 
RCD/Goma, and another side called RCD/Kisangani132. 
The reason for the separation between Rwanda and Uganda was due to President Kagame of 
Rwanda’s preference for a military solution to remove Kabila from power and to denigrate the 
support of the Congolese citizens.133  On one occasion, he said the following at a public meeting: 
“We are not in the DRC because we are loved by the Congolese people.”134 
The Ugandan President did not agree with the Kagame initiative; he preferred an approach that 
would rather assist him to get the popular support of the Congolese population. In other words, 
he required a rebel group without Rwandan participation.135 
That is the reason why he sponsored the creation of the new rebel group called the Movement for 
the Liberation of Congo (MLC) led by Jean Pierre Bemba, who is now facing war crimes at the 
ICC for abuses by his troops in the Central African Republic. The movement became the rival of 
the different factions of the RCD supported by Rwanda. 
The split between Uganda and Rwanda took place in 1999 at Kisangani, sparked off by a 
competition for resources between the two allies. In addition to strategic differences in the 
conducting of the war in the DRC, 136the reason for the division between Rwanda and Uganda is 
due to the control of the rich natural resource province of Kivus. During 2002, Uganda exported 
three times the amount of gold it produced and still from the Kivu provinces, and Rwanda did 
not appreciate it.137 
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After those countries interests in regional security quickly turned to economic profits, Kabila 
began marketing his country’s resources to external defence, further fuelling an economic war 
focused on Congolese resources.138   
Following the split between Kigali and Kampala in January 1999, the pro-Uganda faction of the 
RCD established its headquarters in Kisangani, the capital of the eastern province and it became 
the rival of the other faction, the RCD/Goma.139 The difference between the two rival 
movements of the rebellion lay somewhere else: in the RCD/Goma the movement was controlled 
by the Tutsi Banyamulenge from management to the basic ranks while the RCD/Kisangani was 
headed by Congolese people.140 
The truth of the position of the DRC is that since 1998, after the second Rwanda invasion, it has 
been divided into a variety of different zones, under different political dispensations, and with 
different military situations. Separated from the government controlled areas, there were more 
than four main rebel zones, listed here in order of decreasing territorial importance141: 
1. The Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD/Goma) controlled the largest area, extending 
from north Katanga to north Kivu with chunks of Maniema, Eastern Kasai, and Province 
Orientale; 
2. The Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) controlled the second largest area, 
covering most of Equateur province and the western part of Province Orientale; 
3 The Congolese Rally for Democracy/Movement for the Liberation (RCD/ML) controlled 
most of the area composed of Province Orientale; 
4 The Congolese Rally for Democracy/National (RCD/N) controlled a small portion of the 
former province of Upper DRC; and 
5 The Congolese Rally for Democracy Kisangani (RCD/K) controlled Bunia. 
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The important issue in the division of the political spoils in the eastern province of the DRC was 
the division of North Kivu into two parts: Lubero and Beni were excluded from the authority in 
Goma and incorporated into the Ugandan sphere of control. Rwanda maintained its control over 
the other four territories of Northern Kivu (Masisi, Rutshiru, Nyiragongo and Walikale) 
alongside Southern Kivu, Maniema, Northern Katanga Provinces and a considerable part of 
Kasai. This shows the extent to which the RCD war resulted in the de facto division of the 
country, and the position of Uganda and Rwanda in the east of the DRC.142 
The result of the RDC war was not only a destruction of the unity of the country, but also the 
division of the Kivus provinces into different ethnic groups. After disputes and heavy fighting on 
many occasions in 1999 and 2000, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) ousted the Ugandan 
troops from the town of Kisangani, which remained a Rwanda stronghold, and Ugandan 
President Museveni helped also some Tutsi Banyamulenge to join the MLC movement, the case 
of Mustapha Mukiza (a former member of the RPA).143  
The aims of the rebel movements were to remove Laurent Kabila from power and establish a 
new regime in the DRC. Kabila, to preserve his power, had appealed for support from the SADC 
to stop Uganda and Rwanda progress in Kinshasa, which was Kigali’s objective. 
3.3.4 SADC involvement in the DRC War 
In this section some questions need to be answered: Why did SADC agree to send troops to the 
DRC? What was the motivation of the intervention?  
After the Uganda, Rwanda RCD rebel invasion, the Kabila government approached the SADC 
organ on Politics, Defence and Security at its Victoria Falls Summit of 7-8 August 1998 seeking 
assistance, under Article 59(3) of the SADC Protocol.144 A SADC committee of foreign 
ministers from Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe launched investigations and 
established clear evidence of a foreign invasion.145 On the basic of that finding, the SADC’s 
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Interstate Defence and Security Committee met in Harare on 18 August and authorised an 
intervention by SADC countries to take part in the hostilities in the DRC.146 
This was the first time in Africa that countries in the region had agreed to deploy troops for an 
intervention mission in a conflict in the region. Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe then deployed 
troops in support of Kabila’s regime in the DRC. Sudan and Chad also send troops in accordance 
with bilateral agreements with the DRC.147 
The intervention of the SADC played a vital role in containing and stabilising what had the 
potential to grow into an unstable regional armed conflict. The SADC mission also succeeded in 
defending the DRC’s sovereignty and territory as well as maintaining relative stability until the 
MONUC.148 Following considerable procrastination by the United Nations (UN) Security 
Council, a decision was reached to deploy UN Peacekeeping (MONUC) in the DRC in 2000.149 
The intervention of the SADC in the DRC was also seen as an example of a regional initiative by 
members who sought to reverse the security threat by collective efforts in line with UN Secretary 
General Boutros Boutros Grail’s Agenda for Peace.150  
Angola’s intention in supporting Kabila lay in avenging Mobutu’s ongoing support for the 
Angolan rebel group UNITA, a long-time Angolan anti-government aggressor. Angola was 
afraid that if Kabila lost Kinshasa, UNITA would return to the DRC.151 Angolan intervention 
was mainly in the province of Bas Congo to secure its border with the DRC. Following the 1998 
war, the DRC was divided into three warring areas: Kinshasa, involving the DRC, Namibia, 
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Angola, Chad, and Zimbabwe against Uganda and Rwanda; the South Kivu involving the DRC 
and Rwanda and North Kivu involving rebel movements and Uganda.152 
There is no doubt that the conflict in Great Lakes Region began because different countries 
required border security, state protection and access to land, all within more and more unstable 
military and political environments.153 Unpredictable alliances and political infringements fed a 
situation which was to erupt into further conflict, giving rise to an ongoing situation marked by 
economic conflict and resource competition on the pretext of border security concerns.154  
 
3.3.6 Justification of the States involved in the conflicts  
The DRC was the scene of “Africa’s First World War” which is the first conflict in Africa 
involving nine countries. Why were those countries involved in the conflict? Braekman Colette 
gives us some guidelines:155  
3.3.6.1 Angola 
Angola, rich and with an experienced army, has given assistance to Kinshasa for simple 
reasons: to implement the solidarity agreements between the SADC countries and, in particular, 
to prevent UNITA from establishing a detachment base in the DRC. With a watchful eye on 
their security and their borders, the Angolans would not be willing to tolerate RCD movements 
and Rwandans pushing forward to Lubumbashi or Mbujimayi provinces because, in their view, 
this could restore the opposition Angolan army started by Jonas Savimbi to power.  
In fact they suspect Kigali of having served as a centre for deliveries of weapons and of 
collaborating with UNITA in military matters by supporting RCD in the field. 
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3.3.6.2 Burundi 
The Burundi government admits to the presence of his army in the DRC but limits its activities 
after the first invasion, which had to do with security, to the shores of Lake Tanganyika, on the 
South Kivu border: it operates on the other side of the border to track down Hutu rebels who are 
part of Kabila’s military machine.156 
3.3.6.3 Chad 
The Chadian army also admits its presence in the DRC to support Kabila’s regime, but after a 
few months of participation in the hostilities, the Chad Government withdrew its army. 
3.3.6.4 Namibia 
Namibia maintains 2,500 men in the DRC as part of its involvement under the SADC 
agreements. Its objective was to show its unity with Angola and Zimbabwe, rather than to 
support the Kabila regime itself.157 
3.3.6.5 Rwanda 
The Rwanda regime justifies the presence of its army in the DRC; Kigali has consistently 
referred to its security needs, and the need for tracking down the Hutu perpetrators of genocide. 
In point of fact, it is being motivated by other compulsions: its aspiration to exploit the 
resources in eastern DRC, a dream of territorial growth and, in any case, the desire to install a 
friendly if not submissive government in Kinshasa.158  
Rwanda was also supporting RCD rebel groups. In addition, Rwandans feel deceived by their 
former ally; they are angry at him for having allowed Tutsi to be hunted in August 1998, with 
many of them being killed in Kinshasa, Lubumbashi and other places.159 
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3.3.6.6 Uganda 
Like Kagame, President Museveni of Uganda feels that he was betrayed by his ally Kabila, 
whom he had assisted to put in power. As a matter of fact, Kabila had opposed the Ugandan 
army’s systematic exploitation of the natural resources in the north-east of the country and did 
not plan to submit to the recommendation about political governance forced on him by 
Museveni, who was behaving like the self-proclaimed king of the region.160 
3.3.6.7 Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe was the most able of Kabila’s allies, maintaining a force of 12,000 men in the DRC, 
but it is not the most determinative element. Destabilized by internal disputes and by the 
economic crisis resulting from poor management as well as by the fact that international 
creditors are penalising his country because of its involvement in the DRC war, President 
Mugabe was trying to pull out.161 
Nevertheless, having moved into the DRC in order to defend the Kabila regime and, even more 
importantly, the DRC territorial integrity and the sovereignty of Kinshasa, Zimbabwe cannot 
simply let go of a country in which it has invested a great deal; it is, therefore committed to 
continuing its assistance.162 
3.3.7 Peace Agreements and Major Ceasefires 
The Great Lakes Region conflict has been characterised by continuing attempts by global and 
regional actors to negotiate cease-fires and durable peace with diverging points of 
accomplishment.163 Political issues have given way to economic interests, which has led to rebel 
movements avoiding negotiating an arrangement with the Kabila government because they 
cannot convincingly commit to challengers from replacing them and Kabila openly turned fragile 
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161 Sassoli, M and Bouvier AA How does law protect in war? Vol II Second Edition (2006) 2137 (Geneva: ICRC). 
162 Ibid. 
163 Dunn, KC Identity, Space and the Political Economy of Conflict in Central Africa (2005) 253(London: billon). 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
  	
peace agreements to his advantage by re-arming and organizing his army during the negotiation 
process, with little intention of adhering to it.164  
3.3.7.1 Lusaka Peace Agreement (1999) 
The peace process was also one of the SADC’s missions. After sending troops to support Kabila, 
an emergency summit had taken place in Pretoria on 23 August 1998 and which confirmed the 
SADC’s recognition of the sovereignty of the DRC.165 It also mandated the chair, President 
Nelson Mandela, to arrange a cease-fire in consultation with the Africa Union (AU).  On 3 
September 1999 the SADC unanimously supported the military intervention in the DRC.166 
Supervised by the AU, the first peace talks took place in Windhoek, Namibia, in January 1999. 
In April 1999, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1234 demanding the removal of 
uninvited forces, without clarifying the steps to be taken in case of failure to comply, the 
Resolution 1279 in November 1999 establishing MONUC. 167 
The Lusaka Peace Accord was eventually signed in July 1999168 in two stages. The first was 
between the state parties: Angola, the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe. The 
second stage concerned obtaining the signatures of different rebel movements (MLC, 
RCD/Kisangani, and RCD/Goma).169 
The Lusaka Agreement established some provisions, including the immediate cessation of 
hostilities and military disengagement within 24 hours; the cessation of violence against civilians 
and facilitation of humanitarian assistance; and the establishment of a Joint Military Commission 
(JMC) composed of the belligerent parties to investigate cease-fire violations, work out 
mechanisms to disarm identified militias, and monitor the withdrawal of foreign troops 
according to an established calendar.170  
                                                            
164 Dunn, KC Identity, Space and the Political Economy of Conflict in Central Africa (2005) 253(London: billon). 
165 Mwesiga, B Congo in the Great Lakes Conflict (2006) 63‐64 (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers). 
166Ibid. 
167 <http://www.monuc.org/mission of monuc in the DRC> [accessed 12 May 2010]. 
168Cliffe, L African  renaissance  in T. Zack, W, Frost, D and Thomson, A  (eds)  (2005) 47, Africa  in Crisis,  (London: 
Pluto Press). 
169 See Lusaka Peace Agreement. 
170 Mwesiga, B Congo in the Great Lakes Conflict (2006) 64‐65 (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
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The deployment of a UN force tasked with disarming armed groups ( the Ugandan Allied 
Democratic Forces [ADF], the LRA, the West Nile Bank Front, the Uganda National Rescue 
Front [UNRF], the former Uganda national army, ex-FAR [the former Rwanda army], 
Interahamwe, the Burundi Force for the Defence of Democracy, and UNITA); collecting 
weapons from civilians; providing humanitarian assistance and protection to the displaced 
persons and refugees; and the initiation of a Congolese national dialogue intended to lead to a 
new political dispensation in the DRC.171 
It was to be seen more as an unsuccessful cease-fire rather than a peace accord, and fighting 
continued in the absence of any demilitarisation and disarmament. The implementation of the 
Lusaka Agreement proved even more difficult than its negotiation.172 The conditions in the field 
remained mainly unchanged until 16 January 2001, when the assassination of Laurent Desire 
Kabila by one of his bodyguards brought his son, Joseph Kabila Kabange, to power. 
3.3.7.2 Assassination of Laurent Desire Kabila  
The assassination of President Kabila was a big surprise for African leaders in general and the 
Congolese population particularly. On that day, 16 January 2001, I was an LLB Student at the 
University Libre of Kinshasa (ULK). We had a class with one of Kabila ministers in charge of 
the interior, Professor Mulumba Katchy. After one hour of the lecture he received a call and 
directly stopped the lecture and sent us home without informing us what was going on. After 
leaving the University we heard on the news that President Kabila was shot and transferred to 
Zimbabwe for treatment. 
According to some verifiable sources, around midday Kabila was sitting in one of the offices of 
the Presidential Palace in Kinshasa, looking at papers and chatting with Social Affairs 
Counsellor Emile Mota when one of his bodyguards, Rashidi Kasereka, walked up to him as if to 
                                                            
171 See Lusaka Agreement July 1999. 
172 Dalay, P” Challenges to Peace: Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes region of Africa Third world Quarterly, Vol 
27 No 2, 312. 
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whisper something in his ear. Instead, he pulled out an automatic pistol and fired two or three 
bullets (the various accounts do not agree) at point blank range into the President.173 
There was a lot of shooting which seemed to have come from the courtyard, where elements of 
the President’s bodyguard were exchanging fire with a small group of armed men. The murderer 
ran out of the room. Almost immediately Presidential Aide Colonel Eddy Kapene shot him174 
later the radio then announced that the President had been shot and wounded in an assassination 
attempt. The same day in the evening, after Kabila had been dead for several hours, he was 
transported to Harare/Zimbabwe for medical assistance.175 
Around 6 p.m Colonel Eddy Kapend told everybody on the national radio and television (RTNC) 
to stay at home, asked the armed forces to remain calm and disciplined, and announced that all 
borders were closed.176 But he did not admit the President’s death. The Belgium Foreign 
Ministry, which had its own sources of information in Kinshasa, at 8 p.m announced the death of 
President Kabila.177     
Meanwhile, Kabila’s staff called the whole diplomatic corps accredited in the capital to the Cite 
de l’Organisation de l’Unites Africaine, where they were told that Joseph Kabila, the President’s 
son, was to be head of the interim government for the time being.178 
On 18 January 2001, the government spokesman, Mr. Domique Sakombi Inongo, announced 
officially the death of President Kabila declared that Kabila had died from his wounds and 
announced also 30 days of official mourning.179  
  
 
                                                            
173 See Qui a tu es Kabila?Available at <http//www.congonline.com/jed/Rapports/2001/Rapport‐Deces‐
LDK0305200_04.htm>[ accessed  23 February 2011]. 
174Prunier, G  From Genocide  to Continental War:  The Congolese  conflicts  and  the  crisis  of  contemporary Africa 
(2009) 250 (London: Hurst &Company). 
175 Ibid. 
176 See Qui a tu es Kabila? Available at <http//www.congonline.com/jed/Rapports/2001/Rapport‐Deces‐
LDK0305200_04.htm> [accessed 23 February 2011]. 
177 La chaine Info (Paris), in BBC/SWB, 16 January 2001. 
178 RTNC/Kinshasa, in BBC/SWB, 17 January 2001. 
179 RTNC/Kinshasa, in BBC/SWB, 18 January 2001. 
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3.3.7.3 Pretoria Agreement (July 2002) 
After the assassination of his father, Joseph Kabila stressed the need for faster progress in the 
peace process activities. The Pretoria Agreement was signed on 30 July 2002, between the DRC 
Rwanda and Uganda. The Accord approved that Rwanda and Uganda withdraw their troops from 
the eastern parts of the country in return for the DRC initiating the dismantling of the 
Interahamwe operations into DRC territory.180 The DRC government also reached an accord 
with the rebel groups interested in the armed conflict.181 
The negotiations were held at Sun City, South Africa, and the Accord was signed on 17 
December 2002. It provided for a 24 month transitional period with democratic elections at the 
end of it. Kabila was recognized as President with four vice- presidents from the government, 
MLC, RCD and the opposition.182 The Agreement failed to address policies of army integration 
of rebel movements, rendering attempts at disarmament unviable, and also failed to account for 
the established economic plunder of the DRC resources upon which all parties had become so 
dependent.183 
3.3.7.3 Luanda Agreement (September 2002) 
The DRC government, after signing the Pretoria principle Agreement agreed with Uganda and 
Rwanda in Luanda (Angola) and signed on 6 September 2002 an Agreement in terms of which 
Rwanda and Uganda wove withdraw its troops.184 However, Ugandan economic exploitation of 
Congolese resources continued. Ahead of leaving the DRC, Uganda sent UPDF personal to make 
certain that economic resources flowed directly into Uganda.185 Following its presence in the 
                                                            
180 Reyntjens,  F Democratic Republic of Congo: Political  Transition and Beyond  (2007) 307‐318 Vol 106 No  423 
AfricanAffairs.Availableat<http://www.proquest.umi.com.ezyproxy.flidnders.edu.au/pqdweb?index=PQD&rat=309
&TS=1243298117587CLIENTid=20831&CFT=1> [accessed 16 August 2010]. 
181 Ibid. 
182 See Pretoria Agreement. 
183International  Crisis  Group,  Conflict  in  the  Congo:  The  Current  Situation.  Available  at 
<http://www.crisigroup.org>[accessed 16 August 2010]. 
184 Mwesiga, B Congo in the Great Lakes Conflict (2006) 67 (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers). 
185 See Dobson, Dobson, S “conflict in Great Lakes Region” (2009) Africa on Global Stage 10. 
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DRC, for the first time, in 2002, Uganda recorded an export of three times the quantity of gold 
that it has produced in the past.186 
After the Sun City Agreement and the establishment of a transitional government by the different 
Congolese protagonists in the conflict, the DRC had it first democratic election in 2006 since the 
1960 date when the country had been granted independence from Belgium and Joseph Kabila 
was elected President.187 This had made little progress to removing the causes of conflict in the 
eastern part of the DRC. Following the election the country was not stabilized and armed conflict 
and human rights and humanitarian law violation still was continued in the Kivus provinces by a 
new rebel group supported again by Rwandan President Paul Kagame and led by one Congolese 
Tutsi leader General Nkunda Batuarhe’s National Congress for the Defence of People (CNDP).  
3.3.8 The Role of the International Community or External Actors  
What is the role played by UN and international community to restore peace and stability in the 
region? Although, UN and international community has played a big role in restoring peace and 
stability in the Great Lakes Region and particularly in the eastern part of the DRC.  
The 1999 Lusaka Agreement which represented a watershed in the evolution of peace and 
security in the Great Lakes Region, served as the road to lasting peace. It rapidly became 
apparent, however, that among other shortcomings, the Agreement had largely frozen armies in 
their respective positions but had failed to stop the conflict in the region and in particularly in the 
eastern provinces of the DRC. This also includes the eruption of warfare between the allies 
Uganda, and Rwanda and rebel movements in east of the DRC (Kisangani).188  
As mentioned before, the Congolese conflict changed on 16 January 2001, with the elimination 
of the DRC President Laurent Kabila and assumption of power by his son Joseph Kabila 
Kabange. Joseph Kabila, differing from his father, has reached out to and was sheltered by all 
three members of the troika, policymakers of which praised his commitment to implementing the 
                                                            
186 See Dunn, KC Identity, Space and the Political Economy of Conflict in Central Africa (2005) 256‐257(London: 
billon). 
187 See Dunn, KC Identity, Space and the Political Economy of Conflict in Central Africa (2005) 256‐257(London: 
billon). 
188Khadiagala,GM   Security Dynamic in Africa’s Great Lakes Region (2006) 173 (London: Palgrave Macmillan). 
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Lusaka Agreement.189 Kabila met with the three international community leaders when his made 
his first official visit to Washington, Paris and Brussels. 
President Joseph Kabila participated in the Franco-African Summit held in Paris and was well 
received by President Chirac in February 2003; he met again with the Belgium foreign minister 
Louis Michel, and the Belgium king Albert II; and has met also with US President George Bush 
in October 2003.190 Belgium, France, South Africa (under President Mbeki’s regime) and the US 
have played a big role in the peace process in the Great Lakes Region.191  
The union of interest among France, Belgium and the United States of America in promoting and 
building peace in the Great Lakes Region especially is the result of Kabila’s assumption of 
power after his father’s assassination on 16 January 2001.192 This intervention has contributed to 
an international campaign to ease the diplomatic impasse in the Lusaka Agreement that existed 
from 1999 to 2001. 
South Africa also played a big role in the DRC conflict since the first invasion by Rwanda, 
Uganda and the rebel different movements. South Africa entered the peacemaking in the Great 
Lakes Region through its revered president, Nelson Mandela. President Mandela193officially 
entered peacemaking dispute in February 1997. He facilitated the negotiation between Kabila 
and ex President Mobutu. South Africa was more visible during Mbeki’s presidency. 
President Mbeki brought a new system and approach to the Great Lakes Region peacemaking 
efforts. After succeeding President Mandela to power, Mbeki hinted at a most important 
departure in foreign policy when he announced that South Africa stood ready to contribute troops 
to a peacekeeping mission in the DRC.194 This was different from the Mandela government’s 
reluctance to commit to peacekeeping. On 17 December 2002 in Pretoria (South Africa) and 
                                                            
189Braechman,  C  les  nouveaux  predateurs.  Politique  des  puissances  en  Afrique  Centrale  (2003)  136‐142 
(Paris:Fayard). 
190 See<http://www.worldpress.org.issues  Vol.49 no 10> [accessed 15 May 2010]. 
191 Sunday Times (Johannesburd), 22 November 1998. 
192 Khadiagala, GM Security Dynamic in Africa’s Great Lakes Region (2006) 173 (London: Palgrave Macmillan).  
193SeeLandsberg,  C”  South  Africa  in  ‘s  policy  in  the  Congo  war”  (2002)  Available  at< 
http://www.books.google.co.za>. 
194 See Sunday Times (South Africa) 22 December 2002. 
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under Mbeki’s facilitation and mediation, the Congolese parties reached a final and 
comprehensive agreement on a transitional regime in the DRC.195 
Following the Pretoria Agreement, South Africa’s policy strategy in the DRC has been the 
establishment of the transitional government because of many obstacles in the implementation of 
the Accord between the Congolese parties.196 After the installation of the transitional 
government, South Africa went forward with another strategy by incorporating the DRC on its 
list of countries with which to establish bilateral co-operation, and the two countries concluded a 
number of important agreements.197  
The UN has played a significant role in the DRC conflict. Just a few months after the outbreak of 
hostilities in the DRC, the UN Security Council adopt its first Resolution on the conflict and was 
automatically involved in the Great Lakes Region conflict. Under the chairmanship of Kamel 
Mojane, the UN Security Council established MONUC in February 2000.198 The UN Security 
Council visited Kinshasa, Kigali, Kampala, Lusaka and Harare in May 2000. The mission sought 
the withdrawal of Rwandan and Uganda troops from the DRC and urged Laurent Kabila to co-
operate with the MONUC’s deployment in areas of conflict.199 
In May 2003, Kofi Annan called for an increase in MONUC’s forces to 10,800 after the first 
deployment and recommended an intensification of the UN’s mandate to facilitate the mission to 
provide more efficient conflict resolution efforts and to afford better political support to the 
transitional government of the DRC.200 The case of MONUC will be examined with more detail 
in the next chapter. 
 
                                                            
195 Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 22 November 1998. 
196 Ibid. 
197‘The DRC: Presidents Mbeki, Kabila Sign Co‐operation Pact,’ Available at <http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp? 
Report ID=42969&Select Region=Great_Lakes & sele>.(defence matters; health; economic cooperation; protection 
and promotion of investment; co‐operation in public administration and diplomatic consultation). 
198Malone, DM  The UN  Security Council:  From  the  Cold War  to  the  21  st Century  (2004)  514  (Boulder:  Lyenne 
Rienner). 
199United Nations, Third Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Mission  in the DRC, 
S/2000/566 (2000) 1‐2 (New York). 
200United Nations, Second Special Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Mission  in 
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3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the causes and consequences of conflict between the DRC and 
Rwanda. The recent conflict has poisoned the diplomatic co-operation between both countries 
for more than 15 years and involved nine foreign states. The armed conflict in the DRC was also 
characterised by massive violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law. 
The next chapter will examine the renewing of diplomatic relation between Rwanda and the 
DRC. 
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                                                               CHAPTER 4 
                       Renewing Diplomatic Relations between Rwanda and the DRC 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Insecurity and human rights abuses in the eastern DRC remain serious concerns, despite 
improved diplomatic relations between the DRC and Rwanda after 15 years of tension. Many 
agreements led to a significant improvement in border security in the Great Lakes Region.  
In this chapter, the study will describe the origin of the road to lasting peace, and the renewed 
diplomatic co-operation after the Congolese had confirmed the new elected President in 2006, 
following the dispute of General Nkunda’s CNDP with the Congolese government.    
Diplomats and analysts see the accord thrashed out at a two week conference in Goma under 
intense pressure from President Kabila’s Western allies as the best chance in years of pacifying 
the eastern part of the DRC. The Goma deal establishes a cease-fire and offers an amnesty for the 
rebels and militias, including Tutsi guerrillas loyal to renegade General Nkunda who have battled 
government troops in recent months in north Kivu province.201 
Excluded from the deal are Nkunda’s sworn enemies, namely Rwandan Hutu rebels of the 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) who also operates in the region. 
Failure to eliminate the FDLR rebels will keep alive the justification for Nkunda maintaining his 
own armed rebellion.202 
Rwanda was incriminated by the Congolese government for supporting the new rebel movement 
CNDP headed by the Congolese General Nkunda, and, on the other hand, the DRC also was 
accused by Rwanda for backing FDLR. Following violent fighting during 2008 between the 
Congolese armed forces, called Forces armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo 
(FARDC), and CNDP supported by Rwanda army forces.203 President Joseph Kabila and Paul 
                                                            
201 Reuters, 24 January 2008. 
202 Ibid. 
203 International Crisis Group “working to prevent conflict worldwide” (2009) Crisis Group Africa Report No 150. 
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Kagame found themselves under firm national and international pressure to put an end to the 15 
years of diplomatic conflict between the two countries.204 
The escalation of the north Kivu conflict of August- November 2008 was the direct result of the 
collapse of the Nairobi and Goma peace agreements.205 The Goma Conference and Nairobi 
Communiqué led to a momentary decline in the conflict between CNDP and the Congolese army 
forces and were considered as a new structure for stabilising and restoring diplomatic co-
operation between the DRC and Rwanda.206  
The intensification of the crisis led rapidly to repeated exchanges of accusations between 
Kinshasa and Kigali, illustrating the collapse of the Nairobi Accord process. Rwanda’s regime 
again denied accusation that it was giving any support to Nkunda’s insurgency, and President 
Kagame on 6 September 2008 told the Belgium daily Le Soir that Laurent Nkunda was right to 
have taken up arms against Kinshasa because the Congolese government under Joseph Kabila 
gave greater priority to military action to resolve the conflict in Kivus.207 
Following Rwandan President Kagame’s interview with Belgium daily news Le Soir, on October 
2008 the DRC government accused Rwanda of not only supporting Nkunda’s CNDP forces in 
the Kivus but also reinforcing its own military positions along the border at Bunagala and 
                                                            
204 Ibid. 
205 The Nairobi Communiqué of 9 November 2007 was at the time the most advanced declaration of  intent that 
Rwanda  and  the DRC  achieved  regarding  a  common  approach  to  FDLR  disarmament  and  normalization  of  the 
relations. Besides reiteration of the necessity to respect  each other’s sovereignty, abstain from any act that could 
be perceived as hostile and establish stricter controls at their common border,  its main  innovations were, at the 
political level, Kigali’s recognition that the CNDP was a security threat for the DRC and a commitment by Rwanda 
not  support  Nkunda’s  insurrection.  Simultaneously,  the  Congolese  government  committed  to  prepare,  with 
MONUC’s  support,  a  detailed  plan  for  disarming  the  ex‐FAR/  Interahamwe  by  1  December  2007.  The  Goma 
Conference on Peace, Security and Development for North and South Kivu was designed to find a way out of the 
simmering  crisis  and  a  alternative  to  the military  campaigns  launched  by  the  government  in  2007  that  failed 
miserably  to  end  the  Nkunda  insurgency.  The  21  January  2008  agreement  provided  for  general  ceasefire 
disengagement  and  demilitarized  buffer  zones.  All  armed  groups  committed  to  participate  in  the  military 
integration process, and the Congolese government committed to present a draft amnesty  law to the parliament 
covering political crimes committed since June 2003. 
206 International Crisis Group’ working to prevent conflict worldwide’ (2009) Africa Report No 150. 
207La  guerre  du  Kivu:  feu  vert  de  Kagame  a  Nkunda  Available  at<http://www.digitalcongo.net/article/53534>9 
October 2008 [accessed 25 August 2010]. 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
  	
Kibumba.208 President Kabila had personally declared that President Kagame was directly 
responsible for the atrocities committed in eastern DRC.209 
This particularly situation was convenient for the CNDP, and the cease-fire remained stable from 
October 2008 until the end of that year. The FDLR movement refused also to be disarmed by the 
MONUC or the Congolese government, and the tension between Rwanda and the DRC increased 
towards the end of 2008.210 The Rwanda government has been accused of supplying aid and 
children soldiers to the CNDP and has previously denied these allegations.211  
The DRC’s regime has been accused of working with the FDLR movement to fight against 
CNDP and President Kabila categorically denied the accusation, and refuses to negotiate with the 
CNDP leader General Nkunda, who has threatened to attack Congolese positions.212 
4.2 Intervention of the International Community      
After the controversial declaration by Rwanda and the DRC and following human rights 
violations, sexual abuse and rape in the two Kivus and Ituri, the international community 
recognized the necessity of lasting peace in the region. 213 Thus is was that on 3 November 2008 
the former Nigerian President, Olesegun Obasanjo, was appointed as the UN Secretary General 
special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region.214 After that, Obasanjo travelled through whole the 
region attempting a permanent cessation of hostilities between rebel group and countries 
involved in the conflict. 
The UN Special Envoy Obasanjo met with Angolan President Eduardo do Santos in November 
2008, which led Angola to state officially that it would not send troops to the DRC excluding 
under SADC demand despite an earlier declaration by the deputy foreign minister that troops 
                                                            
208 La guerre du Kivu: feu vert de Kagame a Nkunda Available at”<http://www.digitalcongo.net/article/53534>9 
October 2008 [accessed 25 August 2010]. 
209“Kabila  accuse  directement  President  Kagame  face  aux  elecurbations  de  Nkunda  batware”  Available  at 
<http://www.digitalcongo.net.6> October 2008 [accessed 25 August 2010]. 
210 Congo: “Five Priorities for a Peace building Strategy” Crisis Group Africa Report No 150.  
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were on their way.215 After a SADC meeting in Sandston (South African) on 9 November, South 
African and Angolan would send troops in to the DRC on a peacekeepers mission and not to 
participate in hostilities in support of the Congolese army in the field.216  
Following the Angolan talks with Eduardo, Obasanjo met Kabila in Kinshasa, Kagame in Kigali 
and Nkunda. Nkunda recognised Obasanjo as the official mediator, and they agreed on the 
implementation of an immediate cessation of hostilities.217 
4.3 The road to lasting peace and security   
If you want peace, you must prepare for peace.218 If the DRC and Rwanda want peace, they must 
agree on the kind of peace they want and how to achieve it for the interest of two countries. 
Agreement after agreement in the region ends with the important recommendation that Rwanda 
and the DRC must come up the political will for peace and stabilisation of the region. 
A series of secret bilateral talks were entered into between the Rwanda and Congolese 
governments without much international participation. The foreign ministers of both countries 
announced a joint plan for a military attack against the rebel FDLR, and the DRC government 
agreed to open talks with the CNDP under Obasanjo’s and Great Lakes Special Envoy Mkapa’s 
mediation.219 Presidents Kagame and Kabila expressed satisfaction with their own talks, which 
they called the solution to achieve stability in the Great Lakes Region.220 What is the motive of 
Rwanda and the DRC to restore peace in the region? 
Although, the secret agreement between Rwanda President Kagame and Congolese President 
Kabila was the result of strong diplomatic pressure on the Rwandan government from the Dutch 
and Swedish governments.221 As a matter of fact, when the UN Experts released Report 
S/2009/253 which exposed previous Rwandan involvement in the DRC armed conflict, both 
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countries openly decided to hold back their financial support to Rwanda as a pressuring policy to 
get the Rwandan army out of the DRC territory.222 
This was confirmed by Gunilla Carlsson, the Swedish Minister for International Development 
Co-operation, when he said in a press release that “Sweden is taking the UN report very 
seriously and has stopped the payment of budget support to Rwanda government.” 223After that 
Kigali was again in difficulty, following the Beijing protest over Nkunda’s accusations regarding 
the beneficiaries of the economic contracts signed between the DRC and China.224  
The objective of secret talks between Rwanda and the DRC was to reduce tension and open 
diplomatic relations. The direct dialogue between the two enemies was encouraged by the 
international community and led to the preparation of a joint military action to disarm the FDLR 
by force if they refused to give up. 
On 5 December 2008 the foreign ministers sanctioned the plan at a public ceremony in Goma. 
However, the text and details of the accord remained top secret and MONUC was not associated 
to the negotiations.225 The rapprochement between Rwanda and the DRC was only made 
possible by a secret political pact under which Kabila and Kagame agreed to end the crisis with 
the possibility of neutralising their respective enemies and allies, Nkunda’s CNDP and the FDLR 
rebel movement based long time in eastern part of the DRC.226 
The deal also prevents the integration of CNDP group into the Congolese army forces (FARDC). 
The courage of Presidents Kabila and Kagame to bring Rwanda and the DRC closer represented 
a political move that raised new hopes for regional stability. The implementation of the secret 
bilateral talks did not take long, by the 4 January 2009. The first result ensured when one of the 
military staff of CNDP, the General Bosco Ntaganda, declared in public that General Nkunda 
                                                            
222 “Fourth special Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organisation Mission in the DRC”21 
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had been dismissed as CNDP leader, and said that he planned to help the two countries 
concretise the bilateral engagement.227   
After being removed as CNDP leader, Nkunda tried to oppose his dismissal. However, on 16 
January 2009, his era as chief of the movement ended following a surprise press conference in 
Goma by the Congolese government. In the presence of a Rwanda delegation, General Bosco 
announced that he joined FARDC and was wearing its uniform to fight the FDLR.228 On 22 
January 2009 Nkunda was arrested by General James Kabarebe and has been under house arrest 
in Rwanda until today.229 
Before Nkunda’s arrest on 20 January 2009, the Rwandan army started to deploy in the DRC 
territory, especially in North Kivu as part of the agreement of joint military operations. Officially 
2,100 Rwandan military observers were to stay 20 days, according to the deal.230   
4.4 Joint military operation (Rwanda and the DRC) 
One of the secret deals between Kabila and Kagame was the neutralization of the rebel group 
(FDLR). The mixed military operation by two countries was called Umoja Wetu in Swahili (our 
unity) and through operation Umoja Wetu, the FDLR avoided the direct confrontation with its 
long-term ally (FARDC) and preferred to disperse in the Kivus forests.231  
The rebel group FDLR was not totally destroyed but was only momentarily destabilized during 
the operation in North Kivu, and was still visible and efficient in South Kivu.232 According to the 
official statement of the operation by both countries they recognized the difficulty during the 
operation Umoja Wetu. 233 “The campaign show that Rwanda and the DRC can construct a 
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230MONUC  estimates  there were  in  fact  between  4,000  and  5,000.  See”  Twenty  Seven  report of  the  Secretary 
General of the MONUC”, 27 March 2009, S/2009/160. 
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common future in peace and with respect to the sovereignty of each other”, Congolese Defence 
Minister Charles Mwando said.234   
Rwandan Defence Minister General Marcel Gatsingi also assured the huge Goma gathering that 
the Rwandan Defence Forces would remain steadfast in efforts to help eradicate any menace to 
peace and stability in the sub region.235 
After the joint operation, the Rwandan Defence Forces pulled out of the DRC. Just a few months 
after the operation, the FDLR had re-grouped and organized in the forests, and are back on track 
attacking Congolese civilians and committing massive atrocities. This situation led to a second 
operation against FDLR by FARDC and MONUC, called Kimia II (second peace). 236 
Kimia II ended on 31 December 2009 under heavy criticism for causing civilian suffering and for 
failure to neutralize the FDLR total in eastern part of the DRC. MONUC was also criticized for 
not assuring civilians protection from human rights violations committed during the operation by 
the two parties to the conflict.237 
In January 2010 Amani Leo (peace today), a third military operation was launched by FARDC, 
still with MONUC logistical support, intending to wipe out FDLR rebels within 3 months. 
Amani Leo puts strong emphasis on protection of the civilian population, jointly with the 
MONUC support linked to the FARDC‘s respect for human rights.238  
4.5 Consequence of Umoja Wetu and Kimia II operation 
The repercussions of the two military operations against the FDLR resulted in uncontrolled 
International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law violations in the eastern province of Kivus.  
Before the launch of operations Umoja Wetu and Kimia II, the FDLR members lived in 
numerous towns and villages spread across north and south Kivu intermixed with Congolese 
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civilians.239 According to the International Rescue Committee, an estimated 5, 4 million people 
died between1998-2008, most from preventable diseases as a result of the collapse infrastructure, 
lack of food security, displacement, and detraction of the health care systems.240  
According to many witnesses in the areas of the operations, the FDLR is principally responsible 
for atrocities committed during and after Umoja Wetu and Kimia II.241 In late January 2009, 
FDLR forces deliberately killed at least 701 civilians. Many were hacked to death by machete or 
hoe, some were burned to death in their homes, and more than half of the victims were women 
and children.242   
Another witness interviewed by Human Rights Watch told how civilians tried to flee as the 
Rwandan and Congolese coalition forces engaged in the operation; the FDLR attacked them 
killed dozens with gunfire, rocket propelled grenades, and machete.243 “As I ran, I saw bodies 
everywhere” said one person. They had all been killed by the FDLR.244  
After killing and raping civilians, the FDLR also abducted as hostages at least 46 residents and 
took them to their military camps, apparently intending to use them as “human shields” against 
the impending attacks. A witness said that when the coalition forces attacked Kibua village on 
January 27, the trapped civilians treed to flee, but the FDLR hacked many to death while others 
died in the crossfire. 245 
One person at Kibua who had been abducted by the FDLR told Human Rights Watch that he saw 
FDLR combatants killed at least 11 people, including a pregnant woman, whose womb was still 
open. Another saw an FDLR combatant beat a 10 year old girl to death against a brick wall.246    
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4.6 Improvement of bilateral co-operation between Rwanda and the DRC 
Following the military operations between two countries, things moved in a good direction, 
improving the bilateral co-operation. Just one day after the secret deal between Kabila and 
Kagame UN Secretary General Ban ki-Moon welcomed the first official bilateral meeting since 
the DRC and Rwanda discontinued diplomatic co-operation in 1996. The Secretary General 
commends both leaders commitment to promote peace and stability in the Great Lakes Region, 
and their efforts to jointly address the destabilizing and threatening presence in the DRC of the 
FDLR, who continues to carry out widespread killing and rapes of Congolese civilians in 
Kivus.247 
The statement continued, stating that “the Secretary General is encouraged by the pledge made 
by the two Presidents to consolidate the renewal of their relationship through future meetings in 
both Kigali and Kinshasa”. The statement also said and the normalization of relations between 
the DRC and Rwanda will contribute to the wellbeing of the people of both countries.248 
Since the secret agreement between Kigali and Kinshasa the Accord has led to the opening of 
diplomatic relations between both countries, and to progress in border security. In fact, the 
military approach to neutralize the FDLR led to modest achievements against the Rwandan 
rebellion, including an increase in the rate of disarmament of the FDLR.249 The DRC 
government appointed Norbert Nkulu Kilobo Mitumba as new Ambassador in Kigali, and 
Rwanda also has appointed Amandin Rugira as Rwanda ambassador to the DRC. 
The British Ambassador to Kigali said that “the improved relationship between the two countries 
open a new opportunity, not just for co-operation against the negative forces, but also for 
enhanced economic, business and people to people links to the benefits of the whole Great Lakes 
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Region”.250 The representative of the ICGL, Ambassador Libenata Mulamba emphasised that the 
renewed commitment between DRC and Rwanda will ensure the stability in the region.251  
The relationship was also consolidated by the presence of President Kagame at the celebrations 
to mark the 50th anniversary of the DRC. Before Kagame left Kinshasa he held private talks 
where they discussed bilateral and regional matters including intensification of co-operation in 
different economic sectors. President Kagame speaking to the press in Kinshasa congratulated 
the population of the DRC and said that he was pleased to have been invited to the Independence 
Day celebrations.252 President Kabila also was invited in Kigali for the 48th celebration of 
Rwanda’s independence from Belgium. 
According to the MONUC’s Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and 
Reintegration (DDRRR) section for ex- combatants, 12,468 Rwandan civilians and former 
fighters were repatriated to Rwanda from the DRC until 25 August 2009.253 The report 
confirmed that among the fighters, 23 were from the FDLR rebel group and 2 from the ex 
politico-military CNDP, and all the dependants were all associated with the FDLR. 254  
Following the DDRRR operation, the evolution of co-operation was also observed in security 
border by the opening of the taxes slashes and trade between two countries is now booming. 
Today the Congolese trader crosses the border in the Risizi area to buy tariff- free food products 
including vegetables, and fruits, and the Rwandan population also crossed the DRC border every 
day.255 One Congolese said that “today we are united, a Congolese can go to Rwanda and a 
Rwandan can go to Congo”.256 
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According to the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA) formal transactions between the DRC and 
Rwanda since the renewed diplomatic co-operation has increased the trade volume. Imports and 
exports were at close to Rwf 12 billion and close to Rwf 10 billion in 2008 and 2009, 
respectively.257 The information also reveals that Rwanda’s formal transactions with the DRC 
presented a positive trade balance where close to Rwf 8.5 billion was obtained from the DRC 
against close to Rwf 4 billion spent on imports in 2008.258 However, it is believed that a good 
number of the products that are traded are illegal.259  
President Kagame, during a visit to the Rwanda Western province, urged his compatriot of the 
region to professionally exploit what he described as huge trade potential between his country 
and neighbouring DRC. This improved trade is why traders repeatedly ask for regional stability 
as a precondition.260 
A forthcoming UN Report claims that the Rwanda army and the rebel groups committed crimes 
in the DRC that could be classified as the crime of genocide if proven, according to report first 
published by the French newspaper Le monde.261 
If the Report confirmed the implacability of the Rwanda army, could this obstruct the new 
diplomatic relations with the DRC?  
4.7 MONUC: Overview in the DRC 
The MONUC started in August 1999, when the UN Security Council authorized the deployment 
of 90 United Nations military liaison personnel to the DRC, and in November, Resolution 1279 
was adopted and affirmed that the previously would constitute the UN mission in the DRC.262 In 
2000, Resolution 1291 authorized the MONUC to carry out a number of important tasks, 
including the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, verification of disengagement and 
deployment of forces, and support for humanitarian work and human rights monitoring. Under 
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Chapter VII, this Resolution also provided for the MONUC, to protect its staff members, 
facilities, and civilians against looming threats of physical aggression.263 
The number of MONUC personnel was increased by Resolution 1565 in 2004, with deployment 
to the eastern provinces of the DRC to protect civilians, collect arms, as called for in Resolution 
1493.264 This was authorized to assist the DRC transitional government to provide protection and 
disarm combatants and repatriate them to their home countries. Next, the UN Security Council 
adopted Resolution1906 in December 2009, authorizing the MONUC‘s mandate until the end of 
May 2010. 
After the demand from Kinshasa asking for the removal of the MONUC from the DRC, a 
Security Council delegation visited the DRC government. The MONUC is one of the strongest 
and largest peacekeeping forces in the world with an estimated 21,000 peacekeepers. But in 
response to demands of Kabila‘s regime, the UN Security Council on 28 May 2010 adopted 
Resolution 1925 that authorized a withdrawal of 2,000 peacekeepers.265 The name and mission 
of the MONUC was changed to the Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC 
(MONUSCO) with extension of mandate until 30 June 2011.266 
4.8 Conclusion  
The renewal of diplomatic relation between the DRC and Rwanda was explored in this chapter. 
This showed the significant progress and improvement of diplomatic co-operation with an 
increased in a little stability in the east of the DRC by the support and intervention of the 
MONUC. However the military intervention between the Rwanda army force and the DRC’s 
army did not end atrocities in the region. The FDLR and others rebels group are still committing 
violence against the population until today. 
In the next chapter, the violations of International Humanitarian Law during the armed conflict 
in the DRC and the law applicable in this armed conflict will be analysed. 
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                                                                CHAPTER 5 
          Violations of International Humanitarian Law during the armed conflict in the DRC  
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the character of the multitude of armed conflicts in the DRC since 1996, 
the majority of which have created massive violations of International Human Rights and 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The mini-thesis will examine the question of the 
violations of IHL by the belligerents, categorisation of the conflicts, and the applicability of IHL 
to the armed conflicts in the DRC.  
5.2 Violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 
Civilians are no longer just victims of war today in the world. Sex is no defence, nor is age; 
indeed women, children, and the elderly are often at greatest risk. That is a strange, terrible state 
of affairs in the year after we commemorated the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. These are the words of the United Nations’ High Commissioner for Refugees, 
Mary Robinson.267 
The spread of violence and the massive and continuing violations of IHL throughout the DRC 
cause immense suffering among the civilian population. In particular, acts of genocide, the 
practice of ethnic cleansing, widespread murder, hostage taking, torture and rape, all violate 
IHL.268  
Although women in the DRC encounter violence in all forms, sexual violence has become the 
defining characteristic of the country’s disorder. Extreme levels of sexual violence, perpetrated 
by foreign non-state armed groups, state security forces and UN peacekeepers persist in the east 
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of the country where the armed conflict is continuing.269 Since 1996 when Rwanda and Uganda 
invaded the DRC, there have been massive violations of International Human Rights and IHL. 
According to the MONUC, there were an estimated 14,000 rape cases in 2006. UNICEF and its 
partners recorded 12,226 victims of sexual violence in the Kivus from January to August 
2007.270  
5.2.1 Attacks on the civilian population 
The armed conflict in the Great Lakes Region has violated the principle of IHL by attacking 
civilian population during the conflict. The law of the war prohibited any attack against civilian 
population during international and non-international armed conflict. The civilian population and 
individual civilians shall enjoy general protection during armed conflict.271 
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the 
Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and 
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their 
operation only against military objectives.272 
During the fighting between Rwandan and Ugandan troops in Kisangani at least 200 Congolese 
civilians were massacred in cold blood on 14 and 15 May 2002. The bombing of Zongo by the 
Congolese forces killed 120; in Libenge, 200 killed, Goma between 30 and 65 and Uvira 3 
people were killed; and the atrocities perpetrated by Chadian soldiers in Bunga and Gemena.273 
In addition, the bombing by Zimbabwe troops of villages occupied by the rebels killed many of 
the civilians.274   
Facing an escalating insurgency from early 1997, in the northwest in particular, the Rwandan 
Patriotic Army killed tens of thousands of civilians. According to Amnesty International, at least 
6000 people, mainly unarmed civilians, were killed between January and August 1997 by the 
                                                            
269 See< http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.as?nid=3350> [accessed 28 September 2010]. 
270 See Humanitarian Action plan for the DRC, December 2007. 
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RPA. However the real number of civilians killed was undoubtedly much higher, according to 
the Report.275 
The new UN Mapping Report accuses Rwandan and Ugandan troops of committing large scale 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Report concludes that genocide might have been 
committed during the Rwanda’s presence in the DRC (1993-2003), but the Rwandan 
Government denies and rejects the Report.276 According to the UN Mapping Report, children are 
the victims of some crimes, such as, the recruitment and use of child soldiers in the hostilities.277 
The UN Mapping Report confirmed that at least 30,000 children were recruited or used by the 
armed forces or rebel groups during the armed conflict in DRC territory. In addition, these 
children were subjected to indescribable violence, including, murder, rape, torture, cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment, forced displacements and the destruction of their villages; and 
they were deprived of all their rights as human being and children.278  
The DRC has ratified a number of International Human Rights and Humanitarian treaties 
explicitly prohibiting child recruitment and the use of children by armed forces or rebel 
groups.279 
During the Hutu massacres of 1996 and 1997 “Alliance of Democratic Force for the Liberation 
of Congo (AFDL) and Army Patriotic Rwandans (APR)” troops allegedly killed men, women 
and children indiscriminately, some with hammer blows to the head.280 From 1998 during the 
campaigns against the civilian population, elements of the armed branch of the RCD, the ANC 
and the Rwanda Army reportedly attacked groups of primarily women and children and killed or 
mutilated them in North Kivu.281  
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Women and children in churches (Maniema/DRC) were attacked and huts and houses with 
civilians, including children, locked within them were also set on fire.282 
The civilian population was also the victim of atrocities during the joint military operation 
between Rwanda and the DRC. Human Rights Watch recorded that 1400 civilians were killed 
between January to September 2009 by the FDLR combatants or criminal FARDC units.283 
The Report also confirmed 7500 rapes, 9000 burned houses, and 900000 new Internally Displace 
Persons (IDP) were reported in the two Kivus due to the military offensive.284 On 24 September 
2010, the UN released a preliminary Report that revealed that at least 300 civilians were raped 
by rebel groups between 30 July and 2 August 2010 in the 13 affected villages of Walikale 
region in North Kivu.285 
5.2.2 War crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide 
The UN Mapping Report describes the serious incidents of multiple violations of human rights 
and IHL during armed conflict in the DRC. 
5.2.2.1 War crimes 
The term “war crime” refers to serious IHL violations committed on a civilian population or 
enemy combatants during an international or internal armed conflict, for which the perpetrators 
may be held criminally accountable on an individual basis.286 These crimes are derived primarily 
from the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Additional Protocols I and II of 1977, and the 
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.  
War crimes can be also found in the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), particularly in Article 8.287 
                                                            
282 UN Mapping report 659. 
283 Human Rights Watch report “Conflict in DRC”<http://www.urw.org> [accessed 18 September 2010]. 
284 Ibid. 
285 See <http://www.news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/09/24/c_13527713.htm(235 >women, 52 girls, 13 
men and 3 Boys were raped) [accessed 18 September]. 
286 Henckaerts, JM and Doswald, LB Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol.I (2005) 568‐659 9ICRC: 
Cambridge). 
287 Article 8 of the1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
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The Statute of ICC defines war crimes as, “serious violations of the laws and customs applicable 
in international armed conflict and in internal armed conflict.”288 The Statutes of the ICTR and 
the ICTY and of the Special Court for Sierra Leone provide jurisdiction over “serious breaches” 
violations of IHL.289 In the Dalalic case, Article 3 of the ICTY Statute listing the violation of the 
laws of war over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction, the Appeals Chamber used this expression 
“law and customs of war” included all laws and customs of war in addition to those listed in the 
Article 1 of the Statute.290  
According to the UN Mapping Report prohibited acts were committed during the armed conflict 
in the DRC, such as murder, rape, intentional attacks on the civilian population, pillage and the 
arbitrary destruction of civilian goods.291 The huge majority of these acts were committed against 
protected persons, as defined in the Geneva Conventions, primarily people who did not take part 
in the hostilities, such as civilians and combatants hors de combat.292 
According to the Statute of the ICC, committing sexual slavery, rape, enforced prostitution and 
others form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the IHL constitutes a war 
crimes in international and non-international armed conflicts.293 Furthermore, in the Kunarac 
case, the Tribunal considered that there might be other factors “which would render an act of 
sexual penetration non-consensual or non-voluntary on the part of the victim.”294 
The ICTR in the Akayesu case held that “rape is a form of aggression” and that “the central 
elements of the crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description of objects and body 
parts.”295 The ICTR defined rape as “a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a 
                                                            
288 Article 8 of the1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
289 See Article 1 of the ICTY Statute, Article 1 of the ICTR Statute and Article 1 of the Special court for Sierra Leone 
Statute. 
290 See Prosecutor v Dalalic case No. 95‐5/18‐PT. 
291See UN Mapping Report.  
292 Kalshoven, F and Liesbeth, Z Constraints on the waging of war (2001) 102 (ICRC: Geneva).  
293 Henckaerts, JM and Doswald, LB Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol.I (2005) 324 (ICRC: Cambridge). 
294 Prosecutor v Kunarac case judgment ICTY IT 15.96‐23‐T. 
295 See Case ICTR, The prosecutor v. Jean‐Paul Akayesu. 
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person under circumstances which are coercive.”296 Rape was also classified as war crime by the 
ICTR in the case of Akayesu.297  
The UN Mapping Report also notes that the huge majority of the cruel incidents listed are the 
result of armed conflict, and if proven in a judicial process, point to the commission of war 
crimes as serious breaches of IHL.298 During the conflict in the eastern part of the DRC, Mai-Mai 
and other persons were arrested during the military operations and transported to Rwanda and 
Uganda, where they usually disappeared without a trace.299  
These acts have been qualified as deportation. The Nuremberg Charter had included act of 
“deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied 
territory as a war crime.”300 
5.2.2.2 Crimes against humanity 
Crimes against humanity are codified in Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute of the ICC. The notion 
encompasses crimes, such as, murder, extermination, rape, persecution, and all other inhuman 
acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or injury to body or to mental or 
physical health, when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against 
any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.301 
The UN Mapping Report says that most of the attacks committed during the armed conflict in the 
DRC were directed against non-combatant civilians principally women and children. According 
to the Report, the vast majority of the acts of violence perpetrated during 1993-2003, which 
formed part of various waves of reprisals and campaigns of persecution of Hutu refugees and 
Congolese population, were in general terms all transported into a series of widespread and 
                                                            
296 See Prosecutor v. Jean‐Paul Akayesu. 
297 Ibid. 
298 See UN Mapping Report. 
299 Sassoli, M and Bouvier, AA How does law protect in War? Vol.II (2006) 2143 (ICRC: Geneva). 
300 See Article 6 of International Military Tribunal Charter (Nuremberg). 
301 See Article 7 of the1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
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systematic attacks against the civilian population and, therefore, could be classified as crimes 
against humanity by a competent court.302 
In the Tadic case, the Appeals Chamber established the principle that civilians are protected 
during non-international armed conflicts.303 The armed conflict in the east of the DRC was 
characterised by grave breaches of Additional Protocol I and II which constitute war crimes and 
crime against humanity. In the Kunarac case, the ICTY classified a crime against humanity; an 
attack directed against any civilian population that must have five elements: 
  1.   The must be an attack; 
2. The acts of the perpetrator must be part of the attack; 
3. The attack must be “directed against any civilian population; 
4. The attack must be widespread and systematic; 
5. The perpetrator must know the wider context in which his acts occur and kwon that his acts 
are part of the attack. 
The crimes of sexual violence in the Statute of the ICC are prohibited when committed against 
“any person”, not only women.304 The crimes of sexual violence can also be committed against a 
man. Zoran and Mirjan were accused by the ICTY for crime against humanity and violation of 
the laws or custom of war for killing civilian during the armed conflict.305 
 
5.2.2.3 Genocide  
Article 6 of the 1998 Rome Statute defines “genocide” as acts committed with the intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part a national ethnical, racial or religious group as such, killing member 
of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group.306 The term 
                                                            
302 See DRC UN Mapping Report 493‐499. 
303 See Tadic case, Appeal decision. 
304 Henckaerts, JM and Doswald, LB Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol.I (2005) 327 (ICRC: Cambridge). 
305 See Prosecutor v Zoran Kuoreskis and Mirjan IT 95‐16. 
306 See Article 6 of 1998 of the Rome Statute for the ICC. 
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“genocide” was also formulated in 1948, in the Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention of 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.307 
The UN Mapping Report notes that the question of whether the numerous acts of violence 
committed against the Hutus (refugees and others) constitute crimes of genocide has not attracted 
a significant degree of comment and to date remains doubtful.308 The Report repeatedly stresses 
that this question can only be decided by a court decision on the basis of evidence beyond all 
reasonable doubts.309  
How an attack against civilian population can be classified as genocide? In the cases of Akayesu 
and Musema held that rape and sexual violence could constitute genocide when the specific 
conditions were fulfilled.310 In the Jevesic case, the Trial and the Appeal Chamber agreed that 
the crime of genocide requires a very specific form of intent that will distinguishes genocide 
from other offences such as crimes against humanity.311 
The dimension of the crimes committed against the Hutu ethnic group and Congolese population 
during the armed conflict in the DRC, which implicated tens of thousands of victims, is 
illustrated in the Report.312 The Report states: “extensive use of edged weapons (primarily 
hammer) and the apparently systematic nature of the massacres of survivors after the camps had 
been taken suggest that many deaths cannot be attributed to the hazards of war or seen as 
equating to collateral damages.”313 These acts can be qualified as genocide if proved by a 
competent court. 
The crime of genocide was also recognized by ICTY in the case of Krstic, when he was found 
guilty in the circumstance of killing of approximately 7000 male residents of Bosnia town of 
Srebrenica during the armed conflict.314 
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310 See Akayesu case Judgment and Musema case. 
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5.3 Categorisation of the Conflict  
The conflict in the DRC is considered as an internal armed conflict with the participation of 
foreign armed forces. Diverse facts make it necessary to reconsider this opinion. Foreign armed 
forces, including those who responded to the request by President Laurent Kabila to intervene in 
accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and those described by the 
Security Council as “uninvited countries”, have exchanged prisoners in accordance with the 
provisions of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949.315 
During the armed conflict in the region prisoners have been visited and exchanged in territories 
of the “uninvited” countries; there have been clashes typical of any war between foreign national 
forces in the territory of the DRC.316 Furthermore uninvited State forces have signed the Lusaka, 
Pretoria and Angola Agreements which explicitly refers to the character of the conflicts and 
prisoners of war.317 
In this case there is a mixture of internal conflicts (RCD, MLC against the Congolese 
Government and FDLR against Congolese forces) and international conflict, such as, the conflict 
between the Rwandan and Ugandan forces in the territory of the DRC and clashes between 
FARDC Rwanda and Uganda forces.    
5.4 Application of International Humanitarian Law to the Armed Conflict in the DRC 
IHL as a branch of public international law has been codified in international treaties for a long 
time. The Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and the 
two Additional Protocols of 1977 are the principal treaties concerned with international or non-
international armed conflict. While the Hague Conventions have passed into customary 
international law, the Geneva Conventions have achieved almost universal acceptance and are 
probably binding on a larger number of states than any other treaties.318  
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On 24 February 1961, the DRC acceded to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.319 The DRC 
also acceded to Additional Protocol I of 1977 on 3 June 1982 and Additional Protocol II on 12 
December 2002.320 On 18 April 1961 the country acceded to the Hague Convention and the 
Hague Protocol. The DRC further acceded to the ICC Rome Statute on 11 April 2003.321 
5.5 Legal Qualification of Armed Conflict in the DRC 
IHL as a branch of public international law refers to two different types of armed conflict:  
international armed conflict and internal armed conflict (conflict of a non-international 
character). An international conflict normal refers to an inter-state conflict and is defined as: 
“declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High 
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.”322 
Any difference arising between States and leading to the intervention of members of the armed 
forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one the party denies the 
existence of a state of war.323 It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, or how much 
slaughter takes place. The respect due to the human person as such is not measured by the 
number of victims.324 Why is the definition of an internal armed conflict? Common Article 3 of 
12 August 1949 does not provide any definition of what constitute an internal armed conflict or 
non-international armed conflict. 
An armed conflict of a non-international character exists when there is protracted armed violence 
between government forces and organised armed groups, or between such groups within a 
State.325 This definition was affirmed by the ICTY during the Tadic case.326 Consequently, it is 
                                                            
319 Roberts, A and Guelff, R Documents on the laws of war Third Edition (2000) 498 (New York: Oxford University 
Press).  
320 Ibid. 
321 See Henckaerts M “Rulac paper on the qualification of conflict under international humanitarian law” Available 
at <http://www.adh‐geneva.ch/RULA/pdf_state/Rules‐customaty‐law.pdf> [accessed 20 October 2010]. 
322 See Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
323 ICRC Commentary on the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 20‐21. Available at <http://www.adh‐
geneva.ch/.../qualification of armed_conflict.php> [accessed 20 October 2010]. 
324 Ibid. 
325 ICRC Commentary on the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 20‐21. Available at <http://www.adh‐
geneva.ch/.../qualification of armed_conflict.php> [accessed 20 October 2010]. 
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the ICTY’s view that for there to be an internal armed conflict, non-state armed groups must 
carry out protracted hostilities and that these groups must be organised.327    
In the Akayesu case, the ICTR Trial Chamber qualified the armed conflict in Rwanda as a non-
international armed conflict. The Chamber found that an internal armed conflict existed in the 
case of “protracted armed violence between the government authorities and organised armed 
groups or between such groups within a state.”328 This was based on the ICTY appeals 
Chamber’s definition of non-international armed conflict in the Tadic case. 
The Trial Chamber concluded that an internal armed conflict can be distinguished from an 
internal unrest by its strength and its level of organisation.329 
In the case of the DRC, the conflict has been characterised as an internal armed conflict and the 
question of which IHL should be applicable in this situation needs a clarification. Only Common 
Article 3 and Additional Protocol II apply to non-international armed conflict. These are relevant 
to the DRC (a State Party to these instruments), in which the government is fighting against 
different non-state armed conflict movements. 
The threshold for the application of Additional Protocol II is more important than that of 
Common Article 3, but given the efficient control of territory by certain non-state armed 
movements and their level of organisation, it is believed that in several situations this threshold 
has been reached.330  
Regarding the case of conflict in the DRC, questions have arisen over which rules apply, as 
between Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Convention, as such 
provisions will not apply except when an armed conflict has been identified as non-international 
armed conflict. The current conflict in the DRC confirms the applicability of Common Article 3 
to the Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol II of 1977.     
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5.6 Application of Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Convention 
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Convention provides that in the situation of internal armed 
conflict in the territory of one of the High Contradicting Parties, each party to the conflict shall 
be bound to apply as a minimum certain humanitarian standards at any time and any place 
whatsoever under the following provisions:  
“1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have laid down their    
arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances 
be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction based on race, colour, religion, or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or 
any other similar criteria. 
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with 
respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture; 
(b) Taking of hostages; 
(c) Outrage upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment; 
(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by 
a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized people. 
2. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.  
A neutral humanitarian body, such as the International Red Cross and Crescent, may provide its services to the 
parties to the conflict.  
The parties in the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of 
the other provisions of the present Convention. The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal 
status of the Parties in the conflict.”331 
Common Article 3 has a number of strengths. It is the most firmly established source of 
international law on non-international armed conflict and constitutes the foundation of IHL 
applicable in the DRC situation. It is regarded as a humanitarian convention in miniature or a 
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“convention within the convention” because it embodies the general principles of the Geneva 
Conventions.332  
The majority of the many armed conflicts taking place in the DRC can be characterised as 
internal and decreasing with the Common Article 3 threshold. The applicability of Common 
Article 3 requires that the insurgents must possess organised groups acting within a determinate 
territory and an authority responsible for their acts, and that the de jure government must be 
forced to have chosen the military solution against such groups.333 
The entire DRC rebel groups were a well organised army acting under a responsible military 
command. Those groups’ forces have secured considerable DRC territory under their control 
(east and north of the country) 
In consequence, Common Article 3 has application to the situation of armed conflict in the DRC 
for the following reasons. The fact the DRC government used military forces is a primary sign 
that diverse armed conflicts exist in the DRC territory. Impairment of the normal functioning of 
the State machinery over extended periods of time also suggests that such a situation may be 
regulated by Common Article 3.334 
During international and internal armed conflict, common Article 1 of the Geneva Convention 
highlight that the “High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and unsure respect for the 
Convention in all circumstances”.335 The regulation that IHL must be respected even if the 
adversary does not do so is lain down in many military manuals, which are applicable in non-
international armed conflict.336 The practical utility of respecting the IHL as explain by some 
military manuals that it encourages respect by the others state (adversary), however they do not 
mean that respect is subject to reciprocity.337 
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The ICTY, in its review of the indictment in the Martic case and in its judgment in the Kupreskic 
case, stated that “it was a general principle of law that legal obligations of a humanitarian nature 
could not be dependent on reciprocity”.338  
5.7 Application of Additional Protocol II of 1977 
The DRC acceded to Additional Protocols II on 12 December 2002. Additional Protocol II 
provides interpretative guidance, which will assist in applying the law to the case of internal 
armed conflict in the DRC. 
The scope of application Additional Protocol II stated in its Article 1 as follows: 
“1.This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
without modifying its existing conditions or application, shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by 
Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.  
And relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and which take place in 
territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissidents armed forces or other organized armed 
groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to 
carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol. 
2. This Protocol shall not apply to situation of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic 
acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not armed conflict”.339 
The ICRC in its commentary on the article helps us to determine if Additional Protocol II can be 
applied in the case of the DRC conflict. The ICRC notes that: “the Additional Protocol II only 
applies to conflict of a certain degree of intensity and does not have exactly the same field of 
application as common Article 3, which applies in all situations of internal armed conflict.”340 
In the case of the DRC, Additional Protocol II is applicable. This Protocol prohibits attacks on 
the civilian population and individual civilians as well as objects indispensable for the survival of 
                                                            
338 ICTY Martic case, Review of the Indictment and Kupreskic case, Judgment. 
339 See Article 1 of 1977 Additional Protocol II. 
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68 
 
  	
the civilian population.341 The conflict in the DRC has violated Articles 4, 13, 14 and 17 of 
Additional Protocol II of 1977. 
Article 4(2) states the following: “Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the following acts 
against the persons referred to in paragraph 1 are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place 
whatsoever: 
(a) Violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as 
cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; 
(b) Collective punishments; 
(c) Taking of hostages; 
(d) Acts of terrorism; 
(e) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced 
prostitution and any form of indecent assault; 
(f) Slavery and the slave trade in all their forms; 
(g) Pillage; 
(h) Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts”. 
In the case of the DRC conflict, Additional Protocol II is totally applicable. The UN Mapping 
Report on the DRC armed conflict identifies countries, that could be held responsible for serious 
violations of human rights and International Humanitarian Law committed by their national 
armies during the period under consideration in the DRC, and in particular Uganda, Rwanda, 
Burundi and Angola.342 
It also notes that further investigation could result in determination of the extent to which other 
countries, and possibly foreign companies, carried some responsibility. Furthermore, it notes, 
“foreign countries that bear state responsibility for serious violations of human rights and of 
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International Humanitarian Law also have the obligation to pay reparations to the state on whose 
territory these acts were committed and harm suffered.”343   
Under Additional Protocol I and II attack against civilians are prohibited. The High Contracting 
undertakes to respect and to ensure respect for the conventions in all circumstances, even when 
the behaviour of the other party might be considered wrongful.344 These acts violated the general 
principle of IHL. 
5.8 Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law 
The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols are the principal treaties governing aid 
to, and protection of civilians during international or internal armed conflict. 
5.8.1 Responsibility 
Who can be bound by the law of non-international armed conflict? Common Article 3 to the 
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II bind the States party to those treaties. This 
obligation of the states includes a responsibility for all those who can be considered as agents of 
those states.345 
However, the law of internal armed conflict binds not only the states parties but also the non-
governmental movements to such a conflict through national legislation. Formerly the state is 
bound by IHL, those rules either become part of its internal law or must be put into effect 
through implementing legislation.346  
The precise range of persons who are addresses of IHL on internal armed conflicts has been 
discussed in the jurisprudence of the two ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals.347 Positively, 
not only members of armed forces or rebel groups, but also others mandated to support the war 
effort of one party to the conflict are bound by IHL as well as all public officials as far as the 
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344 Sassoli, M and Bouvier, AA How does law protect in War? Vol.II (2006)(1883 (Geneva: ICRC)                                                                      
345 Sassoli, M and Bouvier, AA How does law protect in War? Vol.I (2006) 266 (Geneva: ICRC)                                                                          
346 Ibid. 
347 See Case ICTR, The prosecutor v. Jean‐Paul Akayesu. 
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governmental side is disturbed will conform with the law  of armed conflict during their 
functions.  
5.8.2 The International Criminal Court (ICC) 
The principle of individual accountability for violations committed during internal conflicts has 
been repeatedly addressed by the UN bodies as violations of IHL could endanger international 
peace and security.348 
The prosecution of war crimes is required by IHL and may be done independently of the 
existence of the International Criminal Court (ICC). As far as non-international armed conflicts 
are concerned, the ICC Statute represents spectacular progress in terms of IHL because it 
contains a detailed list of war crimes in those situations, and confirms once and for all that the 
concept of war crimes also applies to internal armed conflict.349 
Individual criminal responsibility for war crimes committed in internal armed conflict has been 
clearly included in the ICC and others treaties.350 The principle of individual responsibility for 
crimes is a long standard rule of customary International Law already recognised in the lieber 
code and the oxford manual of IHL.351 In the case of Juvenal Kaje, the ICTR accused him of 
failing to exercise his authority to prevent or stop the killing of Tutsis in his commune and for 
sitting up roadblocks.352 
The violation of the law of IHL must require, under customary or conventional law, the 
individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the law.353 This approach has been 
constantly taken by the ICTY and ICTR In the case law concerning serious violations of IHL 
other than grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.354 The list covers serious violations of 
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Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions,355 as well as a large number of other violations, 
including crimes committed on the battlefield.356   
During the armed conflict, the parties involved, have obligation to respect and unsure respect for 
IHL. Commanders have important responsibility in the system of ensuring respect for IHL and 
human rights law. Commanders are responsible for providing instruction in IHL to the armed 
forces under their command; they must give orders and instructions which ensure respect of IHL 
and they criminally responsible for war crimes committed in accordance with their orders, as 
well as for war committed by their subordinates which they failed to prevent under an obligation 
to do so.357 
The ICC has jurisdiction over crimes committed in “armed conflicts that take place in the 
territory of a state when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental authority and 
organized armed groups or between such groups”,358 which is different to the ICTY which has 
authority with regard to any person who has committed one of the crimes listed in its Statute on 
the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.359  
It, therefore, remains authorised to deal with the crimes that were committed, and are still being 
committed in Kosovo. By contrast, the ICTR is authorised only to deal with crimes committed 
during 1994 in Rwanda or by a Rwandan citizen only.360 
According to the Milan case, no circumstance would legitimise an attack against civilians even if 
it were a response proportionate to a parallel violation perpetrated by the other party.361 The 
former Congolese vice-president is accused and facing trial in ICC for failing as a commander of 
                                                            
355 Article 8 (2) (c) of the ICC Statute. 
356Ibid. 
357 See Karad’zi and martic case Review of the Indictment. See also Akayesu case Judgment.   
358 Perna, L “The formation of the treaty law of non‐international armed conflict” (2006) 155 (Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers). 
359Sassoli, M and Bouvier, AA How does law protect in war?  Vol. I (2006) 322 (Geneva: ICRC).    
360 Henckaerts, JM and Doswald, LB Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol.I (2005) 335 (ICRC: Cambridge). 
361 See Prosecutor v Milan Martic case No.IT‐95‐11. 
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chief of the MLC to prevent his troops from war crime and crime against humanity during armed 
conflict in Central African Republic.362 
5.9 Case regarding violation of IHL in the Territory of the DRC 
In 2005 Uganda was found guilty by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for violations of 
human rights and IHL during its occupation of territory of the DRC. During this period of 
extensive ethnic and military conflict in the Great Lakes Region, sometimes known as the 
Second Congo War, Ugandan and Rwandan army forces invaded portions of the DRC.363  
The DRC Government laid a charge against the Ugandan and Rwanda Governments for 
exploitation of its natural resources, IHL violation and other massive human rights abuses. 
After the investigation, the court found Uganda guilty of serious violations of International 
Human Rights and IHL. The court affirmed that there was credible evidence that the Ugandan 
army had committed great atrocities in the DRC, including, torture, killings, widespread 
bombings, and destruction of civilian targets. It also appears clear that the army incited ethnic 
conflict in certain regions, and set up training camps for child soldiers.364  
There was convincing evidence that in camp many Ugandan soldiers trained child soldiers for 
the UPDF, and that the failure to protect children from recruitment into the army occurred in 
areas which were under control.365 A Report confirmed the deportation of recruited Congolese 
children from the Beni, Butembo and Bunia areas to Uganda.366  
These acts committed by Uganda and the UPDF were in obvious violation of the obligations 
under the Hague Regulation of 1907, especially Articles 25,27 and 28, as well as of Articles 43, 
46 and 47 with regard to obligations of an occupying power. 
 
 
                                                            
362 See ICC case the Prosecutor v Jean Pierre Bemba ICC‐01/05‐01/08. 
363 See the Fifth Report of the Secretary General on MONUC (doc.S/2000/1156 of 6 December 2000, para. 75).  
364 See<http://www.icj‐cij.org/docket/files/116/10455.pdf> [accessed 1 October 2010]. 
365 See the Fifth Report of the Secretary General on MONUC (doc.S/2000/1156 of 6 December 2000, para. 75).  
366  See the Eleventh Report of the Secretary General of MONUC (doc.S/2002/621 of 5 June 2002, para. 47). 
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5.10 Conclusion 
Chapter 5 has explored the violations of International Human Rights Law and IHL during the 
internal armed conflict in the DRC. Massive atrocities have been prominent in the conflict in the 
Great Lakes Region due to widespread attacks on the civilian population in violation of the laws 
of war. The Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner on 1 October 2010 published its 
Report on the conflict in the DRC, which Report qualified the atrocities committed in the DRC 
from 1993-2003 as crimes against humanity and genocide. 
The Report states that it is important that a full judicial investigation takes place in order to shed 
light on the reported incidents during the period 1996-1997. Only such an investigation and 
judicial determination would resolve whether these incidents amount to crimes of genocide 
committed in the DRC by Rwandan soldiers. 
There were also questions about the applicability of International Humanitarian Law and the 
classification of the conflict. This mini-thesis classified the conflict as an internal armed conflict 
with the internationalisation of conflict by the involvement of the foreign states during the armed 
conflict. As regards the application of IHL, Additional Protocol II of 1977 and Common Article 
3 of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 have been declared applicable to the internal 
armed conflict that occurred in the DRC.  
The condemnation of Uganda by the ICJ was examined in the light of violations of the IHL and 
Human Rights Law during the invasion of the DRC territory on two occasions. The next chapter 
will conclude the study and give some recommendations.    
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CHAPTER 6 
                                         Conclusion and Recommendations 
6.1 Introduction 
The last chapter of this mini-thesis will contain a brief outline of the research and will also give 
recommendations for durable peace and stabilisation of the eastern provinces of the DRC and the 
whole Great Lakes Region. 
6.2 Conclusion     
The armed conflict in the Great Lakes Region and in particularly the eastern part of the DRC is 
the primary cause of poverty and massive violation of international human rights and 
humanitarian law from 1996 until today. The study has explored the meaning of peace, security 
and poverty. Peace was examined in two different ways. 
Peace as a universal concept and peace in African tradition. In the first perspective, peace was 
regarded as the simple absence of war that is a hegemonic of deterrent peace, also as functional 
and economic interaction or transactional peace. 
In the second perspective, peace in African tradition is a moral value since good conduct is 
required of human beings if the order harmony and equilibrium is to be maintained.367 According 
to African tradition, peace is conceived in different way not only in the view of armed conflict, 
but in relation to order, equilibrium and humanity into community. 
That is why peace is considered as fullness of life, a result of harmonious cohabitation, a gift of 
God and as precondition for progress and prosperity. The term security, conflict and poverty 
were examined. The study perceived conflict as opposition of peace and value. Armed conflicts 
thus were and continue to be a main source of poverty and instability in eastern DRC. Armed 
conflict in the Kivu provinces has been characterised by the serious breaches of international 
human rights and humanitarian law violation. 
                                                            
367 <http.www.afrikaworld.net/afrel/godiorati.htm.africapeace>[accessed 7 July 2010]. 
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The causes and consequences of conflict between Rwanda and the DRC were analysed and it 
was stated that the Hutu refugees in the DRC was the main point of dispute between both 
countries. Ex-President Mobutu was accused of allowing and supporting the genocidal Hutu 
regime in Rwanda by given them refuge in the northern and southern Kivu provinces after they 
fled from Rwanda. But Uganda and Rwanda feared the re-organisation of Hutu refugees and 
decided to end Mobutu’s regime and backed the rebel group AFDL led by Laurent Desire 
Kabila. Their objective was to secure their borders with the DRC by removing anti-Uganda 
rebels (LRA) and Interahamwe (ex-Far) as well as securing economic resources in the east of the 
DRC. 
Rwanda and Uganda invaded the DRC twice. The overall aim was to destroy the Hutu refugee 
camps and eliminate the refugees physically. On 17 May 1997, Kabila’s AFDL with his allies 
from Rwanda and Uganda seized the control of power in Kinshasa. It was considered that the 
new Kinshasa regime did not agree with Rwanda and Uganda. Ex-president Kabila was accused 
by his allies of not respecting the engagement of increased security against Interahamwe militia 
attacks. 
Kabila however accused Rwanda and Uganda of stealing DRC natural resources and interfering 
in the internal affairs of the DRC. Under these circumstances, Kabila ended the military and 
diplomatic co-operation with Uganda and Rwanda. After the collapse of the co-operation, 
Rwanda and Uganda invaded the DRC again. To safeguard his capital Kinshasa, Kabila appealed 
to the SADC for the support.  
The two wars in the DRC were characterised by massive violation of International Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Law. The study classified the armed conflict in the DRC as an internal armed 
conflict which was also internationalised by the intervention of SADC countries. In addition, the 
fighting between Rwandan and Ugandan forces in the town of Kisangani between SADC 
countries and Ugandan and Rwandan armed forces made the conflict more internationalised. 
In case of international armed conflict, if a state intervenes with its armed forces on the side of 
another state, it is generally agreed that this does not change the qualification of the conflict.368 
                                                            
368 See ICRC Commentary 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 1350‐1354. 
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An armed conflict confined geographically to the territory of a single state can, however, be 
qualified as international if a state intervenes with its armed forces on the side of rebels fighting 
against government forces.369 
It is unclear whether external armed force intervention in an armed conflict which would 
otherwise be an internal conflict generates the internationalisation of the entire conflict or only 
the conflict between one or more states. Although the observation is that there are two different 
types of conflict taking place at the same time (international armed conflict and non-international 
armed conflict).370  
In case of the legal applicability of IHL, the Additional Protocol II of 1977 and Common Article 
3 of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 have been declared applicable in the case of non-
international armed conflicts that occurred in the DRC. International Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law violation in the east of the DRC were a serious concern, dispute improved 
military and diplomatic relation between Rwanda and the DRC for more than 15 years. 
After sustained pressure from the international community, Rwanda’s President, Paul Kagame 
and the DRC’s Kabila agreed to end the conflict by signing a peace agreement. The agreement 
allowed Rwanda force to enter in the DRC territory to fight against the FDLR with the support of 
Congolese armed forces. The operation was called Kimia I, II and Amani Wutu. The objective 
was to reduce tension and open a diplomatic relation between both countries. The research 
argued that the renewal of diplomatic co-operation between Rwanda and the DRC will contribute 
to a more peaceful and lasting stability in the region. 
This will promote agreement with others countries in the region, and will have positive impact 
on the political stability of the whole region. What is important here is that the durable 
normalisation of relations between Rwanda and the DRC is essential if the eastern parts of the 
DRC are to be stabilized. The renewed diplomatic relation between Rwanda and the DRC has 
contributed to lasting peaceful, stability in the region and in the east of the DRC.  
 
                                                            
369 See ICRC Commentary 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 1350‐1354. 
370 Nicaragua v United States of America, ICJ Report 1986,Para 114. 
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6.3 Recommendations 
To avoid further atrocities in the region, the study recommends as follows: 
6.3.1 The DRC Government 
The DRC regime has the obligation to secure and protect its population against any human rights 
abuses, by improving the ability of national judicial institutions to hold accountable all 
Congolese soldiers and civilians involved in violent sexual crimes such as rape. The government 
should also provide significant funds for the reintegration of ex-Mobutu soldiers and rebel 
movements through professional trainings and programs on human rights protection and 
humanitarian law.  
The DRC government should plan a strategic joint military operation between FARDC and 
MONUSCO to fight against the FDLR without involving the Rwandan armed forces. This 
should be aimed at disarming the FDLR combatants who refused voluntary disarmament and 
repatriation. The government should also ameliorate the suffering of soldiers by increasing extra 
pay to soldiers involved in operation against the FDLR. 
All Congolese soldiers operating from the east provinces should be transferred to other provinces 
and troops should be sent from Kinshasa to secure the population in the Kivus. Congolese 
military forces based in eastern DRC should be used to secure the border with Uganda and 
Rwanda. 
The DRC government should allow the ICC prosecutor and his team to investigate and try all 
Congolese perpetrators of grave breaches of International Human Rights and IHL. Furthermore, 
the government should continue to arrest and prosecute soldiers who have committed atrocities 
in Kivu and Orientale provinces as the case of 9 Congolese army officers jailed by military court 
for rape in the village of Baraka (Kivu).371 The DRC government should arrest and extradite 
General Bosco Ntaganda to the ICC to face war crime trial. It is also recommended that all 
victims of sexual abuses and armed conflicts should be compensated by the DRC government. 
                                                            
371 <http//www.france24.com> [accessed 22 February 2011]. 
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The government should also continue to reinforce diplomatic relation with Rwanda and Uganda 
by respecting the Mutual Pact on Non Aggression amongst the ICGLR member states.   
The DRC government should organise a national debate on the issue of national reconciliation 
and justice to look into the atrocities committed since the first war of liberation led by ex-
President Mzee Laurent Desire Kabila until today and find a solution to healing the wounds of 15 
years of armed conflict in the country. It is further recommended that the national reconciliation 
commission should not give amnesty to the perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and human rights abuses. The truth must be revealed and the perpetrators must be prosecuted. 
6.3.2 Rwanda Government 
The government of Rwanda should reinforce commitment to respect the Mutual Pact on Non 
Aggression between ICGLR member states particularly the DRC.  The Rwandese government 
should extradite General Laurent Nkunda to the DRC to face war crimes and crimes against 
humanity trials. Further, a national debate should be held on the issue of justice and 
reconciliation with the main purpose of creating a national consent for establishment of a truth, 
justice and reconciliation commission between Tutsis and Hutus. The idea must be similar to the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This can bring an end to accusation of 
harbouring genocide ideology amongst the population.   
The Rwandese government should start direct negotiation with the FDLR movement which will 
allow them to return pacifically to Rwanda to enable the eastern provinces of the DRC to be 
stabilized. If Rwanda still refuses to hold talks with FDLR, the eastern parts of the DRC will 
remain places of instability. Rwanda should continue to improve diplomatic relation with the 
DRC. 
6.3.3 The United National and the International Community  
The UN must establish an ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the DRC (ICT/DRC) to 
investigate and prosecute all the perpetrators of massive atrocities committed in the country in 
violation of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law during the armed conflict. This 
will facilitate the arrest and prosecution of Congolese officers and others states members 
involved in the armed conflict particularly Rwanda and Uganda as suggested by the UN 
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Mapping Report released in October 2010. An ad hoc tribunal will be better suited due to the 
fact, the ongoing conflict started in 1996. 
The international community and the UN should coordinate legal action against the FDLR 
political leaders around the world including those countries and companies supporting the 
movement through fundraising and supply of arms and ammunitions used in perpetrating attacks 
against civilians in the DRC.  
The international community should continue to put more pressure on Rwanda and the DRC in 
their commitment to improve and respect the peace process in the whole region and in particular 
the eastern provinces of Kivu. 
The UN and the international community have the possibility and ability to change the political 
dynamic of the DRC and Rwanda by adopting productive and strong strategies. The MONUSCO 
(ex-MONUC) should remain in the DRC to improve security of population in the east of the 
country. It mandates should be renewed every year until the FDLR and LRA rebels stop the 
massacre of innocent civilians in the region. MONUSCO should supervise the November 2011 
general elections in DRC and the election must be democratic, transparency and independent to 
avoid what happened recently in the Ivory Cost.  
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